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PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE BALANCE - THE BURGER
COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY
ELIZABETH G. PATTERSON*
The concept of property, so fundamental to our economic and so-
cial orders, seems capable of intelligent definition, and most Americans
would profess a fairly clear understanding of what the term means. It
thus seems anomalous that courts attempting to apply the constitutional
protections of property have difficulty distinguishing between protected
and unprotected interests. For instance, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged recently that it has been "unable to develop any 'set formula' for
determining when" private property has been taken for public use, in-
stead basing its determination on "ad hoc, factual inquiries."'
The concept of property is not static. It has grown from the histori-
cal concept developed in feudal England2 to encompass intangible eco-
nomic interests and government entitlements,3 and it is continually
changing to reflect new circumstances.4 Because circumstances have
changed significantly since the colonial era, to the modern layman or
lawyer the concept of property differs from that intended by the colonial
farmers and merchants who drafted and ratified the Constitution.
Thus, judicial difficulty in defining and redefining "property" is not al-
together surprising. To add to the difficulty, under the "bundle of
rights" interpretation, the concept of property has been subdivided into
potentially infinite component parts.' The Constitution protects prop-
erty interests, but complex definitional issues arise: An interest at what
point in time qualifies as property? How narrow an interest qualifies?
And most important, to what extent should the Constitution impede
legislative attempts to redefine the concept of property to meet the
changing needs of the public?
The jurisprudence of constitutional property has been shaped by
the Supreme Court's deference to the legislative response to changing
* B.A. 1968, Agnes Scott College; J.D. 1976, University of Arizona. Associate Professor
of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
2. See generally C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1962).
3. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
4. Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American Law, 1780-1860, 40
U. CHI. L. REV. 248 passin (1973); Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA.
L. REV. 691 (1938); Powell, The Relationshi.p Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 135, 139 (1963).
5. See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-28 (1977).
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societal demands. The Court's analysis of disputes involving property
rights is but one variant of an analytical framework common to all con-
flicts between the immediate public interest, as determined by the legis-
lature, and the enduring public interest in protecting certain spheres of
individual self-determination from majoritarian concerns. 6 Every case
in which a party seeks to insulate himself from state action by asserting
an individual right, including a property right,7 involves a balancing of
the competing constitutional interests in democracy' and liberty.9 Cast
in the role of final arbiter, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Bill of
Rights and other right-guaranteeing provisions of the Constitution to
require a balancing of public and private interests, rather than to re-
quire the predominance of one interest over the other."'
Recognizing that choosing between the interests of various sectors
of the community is primarily a legislative responsibility, and that con-
stitutionally based determinations that result from a judicial balancing
are relatively immutable, the Court has conducted much of its balanc-
ing analysis according to formulae which defer to legislative decisions.
A legislative deprivation of liberty generally will be upheld unless it is
irrational, that is, unless it is not reasonably calculated to further a legit-
imate governmental goal." As a general rule, the Court gives the demo-
6. See generaly A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-27 (1962) (discussing
conflict between judicial review and representative government).
7. "[Tihe dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Prop-
erty does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful
deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth, a 'personal' right
." Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
8. The democracy interest should be read to encompass both the interest in preserving
democratic processes and the interest in achieving the public goal that is the subject of the
challenged act. The democracy interest, of course, derives its legitimacy from the constitu-
tional provisions establishing the federal government structure, U.S. CONST. arts. I-111, and
from article IV, section 4, guaranteeing to every state "a Republican Form of Government,"
id. at art. IV, § 4.
9. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934). The term "liberty" here encom-
passes the two interrelated individual interests in liberty and property. See Lynch v. House-
hold Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. at 552, quoted supra note 7.
10. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 680-81, 691-93 (1972) (freedom of the
press); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) (freedom of association); see also
P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 296-98 (2d ed. 1983) (unpub-
lished concurring opinion of Cardozo, J., in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398 (1934)).
A notable dispute in this area involves the insistence of several recent Justices that the
first amendment protections of speech be read as absolute prohibitions. See, e.g., Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874 (1960). Some provisions, of course, anticipate by their language a
balancing process, for instance, the fourth amendment's prohibition only of "unreasonable"
searches and seizures.
11. "[T]hat the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means
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cratic process itself the highest constitutional priority, reflecting the
belief that political liberty is the primary guarantor of personal liberty."2
The stated limitation does no more than demand that governmental
bodies exercise their authority in a rational fashion.'
3
For the high priority democracy interest to be questioned in the
balancing process, the other side of the scales must be occupied by an
interest to which the Constitution accords similar primacy, such as the
specific liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the anti-discrimina-
tion principle inherent-at least as to race-in the civil war amend-
ments, and other liberties which are accorded fundamental status on the
basis of social consensus, constitutional penumbras, or other criteria. If
high priority interests clash-the majoritarian will versus what is com-
monly called a "fundamental" liberty-the Court will not accept with-
out scrutiny the superiority of the democracy interest, but will examine
more closely the interests on both sides of the scales to determine which
should prevail. The analysis here usually focuses on the nature of the
threatened fundamental liberty interest. 4 The Court's assessment of its
importance determines how substantial a public welfare interest must be
linked with the basic democracy interest on the other side of the scales in
order for the latter to prevail.' 5 Further, even if the legislation is able to
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the objective sought to be attained."
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934), quoted in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Rob-
ins, 447 U.S. 74, 85 (1980). Legitimate government goals derive from the power of the rele-
vant governing body: for the states, the police power authorization to protect the public
health, safety, morals, and welfare; for the federal government, the powers delegated to it by
the states in the constitution.
12. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 53-61 (1969).
The Court's high regard for the legislative process is evident in cases such as Hawaii Housing
Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2331-32 (1984) (state may constitutionally enact land redis-
tribution program); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3261 (1984) (state may
constitutionally enact requirement that Jaycees admit women to membership). Cf United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (indicating that more exacting
judicial scrutiny may be called for when legislation restricts the very "political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation").
13. For discussion of the meaning and limitations of this criterion, see Ely, Legis/ative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 passbn (1970).
14. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (198 1)(stating that the nature
of the right threatened, rather than the power exercised or the limitation imposed, determines
the standard of review); Carolene .Products 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (legislation that restricts areas
specifically protected by Constitution subject to greater scrutiny).
15. The Court sometimes appears reluctant to perform a true balancing of the competing
fundamental interests, probably because of the subjectivity inherent in any such process. Cf
Ely, supra note 13, at 1246-47 (value preferences inherent in choosing between various aspects
of the public welfare). Thus, in many instances the choice of a formula also is a choice of the
outcome. This was particularly true under the Warren Court's rigid two-tier equal protection
standard which is still in use to some extent. Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Mlodelfor a Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 10-16 (1972). If
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pass the stated test, the Court may require that the legislation be finely
drawn because the restriction on fundamental liberties can be no greater
than is necessary to achieve the legislative goal.16
Although this analytical framework is explicitly used less often for
property cases than for cases in which other individual liberties are at
issue, the same balancing formula is apparent in property cases, though
with certain characteristics peculiar to the property context. 17 One such
characteristic appears in the first step of the analysis-the assessment of
challenged legislation created a suspect classification (e.g., one based on race) or restricted the
exercise of a fundamental right, it must be justified by a compelling state interest. However,
no compelling state interest was ever found. If the legislation did not possess one of these
attributes, it could be justified under the rationality test, a test which was virtually always
met. Id. at 8 (scrutiny of laws affecting fundamental rights or creating suspect classifications
was " 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact;" other laws received "minimal scrutiny in theory and
virtually none in fact.") The two-tier standard has not been so rigidly applied by the Burger
Court. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2035 (1983) (finding a
compelling state interest in denying tax exemption to schools practicing religously motivated
racial discrimination). It is worth noting, of course, that the compelling state interest found
in Bob Jones was itself of fundamental stature.
16. Eg., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972) ("overbreadth" standard in first
amendment adjudication); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 353 (1972) (least restrictive al-
ternative standard in equal protection adjudication).
17. It might seem that the balancing methodology is inappropriate for review under the
takings clause, Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness.- Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
'"ust Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1193-96 (1967) (arguing against balancing
on utilitarian grounds), since a decision in favor of the individual right does not preclude the
government from acting but merely requires the payment of compensation to legitimize the
government act. Thus the democratic process and its majoritarian goals are not thwarted.
Nor is this argument affected by the present controversy concerning permissible remedies for
a regulation taking. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 270, 598 P.2d 25, 28,
157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979) (landowner may challenge zoning action by seeking manda-
mus or declaratory relief but may not sue in inverse condemnation), afd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980);
Buescher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Eminent Domain by the Courts.
So-Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, 1 URB. L. ANN. 1 (1968). If compensation is disallowed
as a remedy, such that the action results in invalidation of the regulation, the state may
subsequently reinstate the regulation by voluntarily commencing an eminent domain pro-
ceeding.
Such an argument overlooks both theoretical and practical considerations. From the
latter perspective, the realities of government finance dictate that in many, if not most, in-
stances a requirement that compensation be paid may be the practical equivalent of a com-
plete prohibition of government action. Agbs, 24 Cal. 3d at 276, 598 P.2d at 30-31, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 377; Buescher, supra, at 1-2, 9; Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New
Direction in Land Use Law, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1597 (1977).
Further, the prohibition against taking private property for public use without just
compensation must be recognized as the theoretical equivalent of the prohibition against
abridging freedom of speech. Each of these provisions establishes an individual right-in the
latter example, the right to speak freely without government interference; in the former, the
right to receive just compensation for interests in property that have been appropriated
by government. In each case the right is a high-priority constitutional value. Conflicts with
other such priority values, including that represented by the democratic process, are inevita-
ble. A balancing analysis is an appropriate means for resolving such conflicts. Cf B.
1984]
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the public interest in the democratic process, the outcome of which is
sought to be invalidated. Although the Burger Court is always highly
deferential to the prerogatives of legislatures, particularly those of the
several states,"8 nowhere is its deference more evident than in the prop-
erty context.' 9
The deferential stance of the Burger Court is consistent with tradi-
tion." The Constitution delegates to the federal government no direct
authority concerning any property other than its own,2' and state pri-
macy in this area is virtually undisputed. Nevertheless, the extent to
which the present Court defers to state definitions and redefinitions of
property to the exclusion of substantial federal concerns, including those
ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 28-29 (balancing analysis determines what amount of compensa-
tion is "just").
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court has characterized the takings
inquiry as one that "necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests." Agins,
447 U.S. at 261. Although not stating explicitly that a balancing test is being applied, other
takings cases utilize an inquiry into the importance of the public (majoritarian/democracy)
interest and the severity of the private deprivation (property interest), which has the indica
of the balancing test described herein and in Agins. E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-28 (1978).
It should be noted finally that even if the analysis were not termed a balancing, it
would remain necessary to define a limited realm of property entitled to the protection of the
takings clause such as the "constitutional property" described herein. As the Court has stated
on numerous occasions, "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922), quoted in Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 124. Nor has a contrary interpretation been accepted by the Court at any time in its
history.
18. The Court recently acknowledged that principles of comity and federalism "have re-
ceived considerable attention in our decisions," noting: "The very vastness of our territory as
a Nation, the different times at which it was acquired and settled, and the varying physio-
graphic and climatic regimes which obtain in its different parts have all but necessitated the
recognition of legal distinctions corresponding to these differences." California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645, 648 (1978); see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244,
3261 (1984) (holding that state law requiring Jaycees to admit women as members does not
infringe on constitutional right of free association).
19. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (state may
adopt reasonable restrictions on private property); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1978) (state law defines right to public utility service); Oregon ex rel.
State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 (1977) (Court has consist-
ently held that state law governs issues relating to property).
20. See, e.g., Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1944) (declining to
construe federal law to override state property law). Of course, a limited federal role exists in
defining and controlling property rights. For instance, when federal law creates a property
interest, such as the interest of a medicaid recipient in continued benefits, federal law has a
substantial role in defining the rights and responsibilities inherent in that form of property.
See O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 785-88 (1980). The federal gov-
emnment may also act within its delegated powers in a way that operates to redefine property
rights. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 275-83 (1981).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I; id. art. IV, § 1.
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grounded on the Constitution, is notable.22 A series of cases involving
property rights related to navigable waters dramatically illustrates the
Court's deference. Reversing a long-standing trend,2" and at least one
quite recent case,24 the Burger Court has repeatedly upheld state power
to define property rights in most navigable waters and related lands,25 a
power previously regarded as largely a federal constitutional preroga-
22. In the limited areas in which exercise of powers delegated to the legislative or execu-
tive branches of the federal government affects property, deference is also shown to those
bodies by the Court. See, e.g., Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 281-83 (applying rational
basis test to federal strip mining regulations); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 (1979) (up-
holding Secretary of Interior's interpretation of statute prohibiting commerce in eagles). In
short, the Court views the role of federal courts in defining and redefining property as a very
limited one.
23. A dissenter in one of the cases stated, "Only the revisionary zeal of the present major-
ity can explain its misreading of our cases and its evident willingness to disregard them."
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 693 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
24. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977),
overruhng Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
25. In Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. the Court held that state rather than federal law should
determine title to land exposed by and newly submerged by a change in the course of a
navigable river. Corvallh Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. at 378. The Court overruled Bonelli
Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973), which held that since the state's title to the river
bed derived from federal law, federal law continued to govern in determining the scope of the
state's rights pursuant to such title. The Corvalh Sand & Gravel Co. opinion essentially limited
the federal government's role to that of a proprietary transferor; once having parted with
unrestricted title, it no longer had the power to limit the property conveyed. The state, as
sovereign, now had the power to determine the property interests of the various parties. Cor-
vallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. at 370-71. But see California v. United States, 457 U.S. 273,
278 (1982) (federal law determines effects of accretive or avulsive changes in waters forming
interstate or international boundary).
The following year the Court again reversed direction in upholding states' power to
define and restrict property rights in water where not clearly preempted by federal law. Cali-
fornia v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 677-79 (1978). Despite contrary dicta in a series of cases
decided between 1958 and 1963, Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 586-87 (1963); City of
Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627, 630 (1963); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357
U.S. 275, 291 (1958), the Court held that the federal government must comply with state
water laws in appropriating water for a federal reclamation project, so long as such laws are
not inconsistent with clear congressional directives relating to the project. Specifically, the
Court allowed the state to impose conditions on the control, use, or distribution of the water
from the project, thus recognizing in the states the power to limit significantly the federal
government's property rights in the impounded water, contrary to the tenor, if not holdings,
of case law during the prior twenty years.
In a third case the following year, the Court again indicated its displeasure with the
primacy of the navigation servitude, resorting solely to state law to determine property rights
in a certain pond despite the pond's apparent navigability. Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979). Justice Blackmun dissented forcefully from this holding. Id. at 181-92
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). It is probably the Court's attitude toward the navigation servi-
tude, particularly as manifested in this case, that caused him in a later case to dissent to only
the following sentence in the majority opinion: "Nor as a general proposition is the United
States, as opposed to the several states, possessed of residual authority that enables it to define
'property' in the first instance." Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88-89
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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tive. Similarly, the Court has granted to the states the primary role in
determining whether particular government benefits constitute property
protected by the due process clause, despite protests that this should be a
matter of federal constitutional law. 6 The Court consistently has given
greater attention and deference to the states' power to define and rede-
fine property interests2 7 and has strongly favored state-defined property
interests in the balancing process inherent in much constitutional adju-
dication. Thus both state restrictions on property rights 28 and state pro-
tections of property rights that inhibit other individual liberties29 are
given substantial weight by the Court in its balancing.3 °
26. A substantial body of recent case law explores the question of whether entitlement to
a particular government benefit such as welfare, government employment, or an education
embodies the characteristics of property to such an extent that the state may not terminate
the benefit without providing procedural protections. Eg., O'Bannon v. Town Court Nurs-
ing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 786 (1980) (continued nursing home benefits); Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 347 (1976) (at will employment contract); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
578 (1972) (fixed term employment contract); see Reich, supra note 3.
The Court has rejected custom and practice as bases for protected expectancies. See
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442-44 (1979) (per curiam). Where a property interest has been
recognized, the basis of the interest is found in either statute, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 163 (1974) (federal statute gives employee property interest in continued employment) or
contract, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 600 (1972) (provision in Faculty Guide may
give rise to property interest in tenured employment). Even where the words of a statute
would appear to create a protected expectancy, the Court has held that a limiting judicial
interpretation of the statute subsequent to the termination of the benefit can retroactively
negate the legitimacy of the expectation. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 347 (1976).
Further, various members of the Court have toyed with the idea that as part of a
state's power to define property rights, it may define the procedural protections that attach to
such rights, thus displacing any additional procedures that might be called for by due process.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 163 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and
Stewart, J., plurality opinion); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 586-87 (1975) (Powell, J., joined
by Blackmun, Rehnquist, JJ., and Burger, C.J., dissenting). Although a majority of the Jus-
tices had embraced this idea at one time or another, it has been firmly rejected in recent
opinions of the Court, both before and after the replacement of Justice Stewart with Justice
O'Connor. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 431-32 (1982); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 490-91 (1980).
See generally Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property". Adjudicative Due Process in the
Adminirtrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977).
27. Eg., Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532 & n.26 (1982); Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
28. See, e.g., Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 88; Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 3
(1974).
29. This is illustrated, for instance, in conflicts between state-guaranteed property rights
and free speech. E.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-78
(1977); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972); cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 748-50 (1978) (upholding FCC authority to penalize radio broadcaster of indecent after-
noon program in part because of intrusion on the privacy of the home).
30. An excellent illustration is provided by the cases concerning speech and petition ac-
tivities in privately owned shopping centers. Initially presented with cases in which state law
protected the property holder's right to remove participants in such activities, the Court held
[VOL. 43:518
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Due to this deference, most challenges to legislation that restrict
property rights are analyzed under the basic rationality standard. 3'
Only limited aspects of property are treated as fundamental. Thus re-
strictions on property rarely demand a higher level of majoritarian ac-
countability than mere rationality. Some property interests are
fundamental, however,32 and their identification proceeds in much the
same way as the identification of other fundamental interests.
This Article will attempt to identify the fundamental aspects of the
individual right to property by examining a broad spectrum of constitu-
tional and quasi-constitutional decisions involving the concept of prop-
erty. It will consider not only holdings, but also other statements that
indicate the Court's attitude towards various property interests. The fo-
cus of the Article will be on opinions of the Burger Court for two rea-
sons: First, the Burger Court has devoted more explicit discussion to
property concepts than any Court since the Depression era; and second,
the Court's most recent opinions evidence the treatment of property at
its current evolutionary stage. The Article initially will focus on the
that the first amendment did not preclude enforcement of such laws. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (together reversing
Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968)). The
state took the opposite role in a subsequent case, its highest court holding that the state's own
constitutional guarantee of free speech protected such speech and petition activities.
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1979). Called upon to determine whether state law in this posture represented an unconsti-
tutional infringement of property rights, the Court once again ruled in favor of the state.
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980). Thus resolution of this con-
frontation between private property and free speech was left completely in the hands of the
states.
The Court also has relied heavily on state property law in defining the scope of the
fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure. See, e.g., Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 598-600 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 112-13 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142-49 & n. 12 (1978) (reversing
prior trend away from use of property concepts).
31. See nrunyard, 447 U.S. at 80-88; tfa note 67 and accompanying text.
32. On the present Court, only Justice Marshall has expressly recognized the concept of
"core" (constitutional) property. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting). How-
ever, the Court has differentiated various personal interests served by property, according
them varying weights in constitutional adjudication. E.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S.
Ct. 1652, 1661-63 (1984) (discussing privacy and possessory interests in fourth amendment
law). A dramatic example of the Court's identifying and according constitutional protection
only to those property rights deemed fundamental is found in Oliver v. United States, 104 S.
Ct. 1735 (1984). In upholding a warrantless government intrusion onto undeveloped land,
the Court held that the privacy interest protected by the fourth amendment is not inclusive of
all rights against intrusion protected by the common law of trespass. "The existence of a
property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legiti-
mate." Id. at 1743 ("legitimate" here connotes fundamentalness). Examination of a broad
range of recent opinions reveals a notable consistency in those aspects of property that have
been accorded priority in constitutional and related adjudication.
1984]
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Court's method of defining property. Then the relevant decisions will
be examined substantively to identify the four interests central to the
Constitution's protection of property: autonomy, privacy, protection of
investment, and physical control. Conclusions regarding the current
definition of fundamental property can be drawn from an analysis of the
Court's treatment of each of these four interests.
I. IDENTIFYING FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY INTERESTS
The starting point for defining the fundamental aspects of prop-
erty-which will here be collectively referred to as "constitutional prop-
erty"-is the express protection provided by four provisions in the Bill of
Rights:3 3 (1) the third amendment's prohibition against quartering
soldiers in private homes; (2) the fourth amendment's rejection of unrea-
sonable searches and seizures; (3) the fifth amendment's ban on depriva-
tions of property without due process; and (4) the fifth amendment's
prohibition of the taking of property without just compensation. In-
deed, the existence of these four provisions, together with numerous
other postures in which property questions reach the Court,34 seems to
have impeded the development of a coherent doctrine of constitutional
property, creating instead a fragmented approach that masks the simi-
larities of cases arising under different clauses. Nonetheless, there are
similarities in the property cases, and it is possible to derive a pattern
which could serve as the framework for a doctrine of constitutional
property.
Protection of "expectations" is a prevalent element of constitutional
property analysis. Although particularly apparent in cases in which the
Court has found governmentally derived benefits to be protected by the
due process clause, 35 expectations analysis also has been prominent in
33. Although the Bill of Rights itself applies only to the federal government, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment applies to the states and has been interpreted to
incorporate the protections of the fourth amendment and the takings clause of the fifth
amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (search and seizure); Chicago Bur-
lington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236-41 (1897) (takings). The third amend-
ment has not been made applicable to the states, and a fact situation calling for such
application is unlikely. See P. BREST, supra note 10, at 397 n.1.
34. For instance, property questions arise in cases interpreting statutes not primarily con-
cerned with property, such as the National Labor Relations Act, see supra notes 124-36 and
accompanying text; in cases in which a law that protects property rights is challenged as
violative of some other constitutional right, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 576 (1977) (challenging constitutionality of tort of right of publicity on first
amendment ground); or in cases questioning the respective rights of state and federal govern-
ments to make decisions concerning property, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
35. E.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 443 (1979) (per curiam) (attorneys' interest in ap-
pearing pro hac vice in a state in which they are not admitted to bar); Bishop v. Wood, 426
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recent cases under the takings clause 6 and the fourth amendment.3,7
For instance, in the landmark takings case Penn Central Transportatton Co.
v. New York City, the Court stated:
"Government hardly could go on if to some extent values inci-
dent to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law,". . . and this Court has
accordingly recognized, in a wide variety of contexts, that gov-
ernment may execute laws or programs that adversely affect
recognized economic values. Exercises of the taxing power are
one obvious example. A second are the decisions in which this
Court has dismissed "taking" challenges on the ground that,
while the challenged government action caused economic
harm, it did not interfere with interests that were sufficiently
bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to
constitute "property" for Fifth Amendment purposes. 8
The expectations analysis apparently is based on social consensus,
which has been criticized by commentators as too subjective to support
a constitutional doctrine.3 9 The Court, however, appears to have lim-
ited the aspects of social consensus/expectations it will consider relevant
in constitutional property analysis to expectations which are derived
from certain relatively observable sources, including the property-re-
lated constitutional provisions themselves. In this context, those provi-
sions can be viewed as reflecting, or creating, expectations that the
specific constitutional prohibitions will be observed and also that the
type of property interest protected by the Constitution will be respected
in a more general sense-the penumbral effect.' By treating the
U.S. 341, 344-46 (1976) (policeman's interest in continued employment); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1971) (nontenured professor's interest in continued employment).
36. See cases cited in/ra note 49.
37. The crucial inquiry in recent fourth amendment jurisprudence has been whether the
government intruded into an area as to which the complainant held a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1740 (1984); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 148-50 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
38. 438 U.S. at 124-25 (1978) (citation omitted); accord Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 179 (1979) (stating that Corps of Engineers' consent to certain improvements affect-
ing navigable water could "lead to the fruition of a number of expectancies embodied in the
concept of 'property'-expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the Government must con-
demn and pay for before it takes over the management of the land owner's property").
39. See generally Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: the Essential Contradictions of Nor-
mattoe Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1088-89 (1981).
40. Using penumbras or underlying values aids in adapting the provisions of the Consti-
tution from the social, political, and economic conditions of the late eighteenth century to the
vastly altered circumstances of the present. See Wofford, The Blindng Light. The Uses of Htog
in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 502, 524-27 (1964). That natural and neces-
sary adaptation would be unnecessarily stultified if constitutional protections were limited to
the particular problems that concerned the framers and that they sought to avoid through the
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express provisions as sources of expectations that, in turn, have an effect
outside the realm of the source provision, a broader, more cohesive ana-
lytical framework can be achieved and the fragmentation problem al-
luded to earlier can be largely avoided.
Further, the Court has indicated in several areas that traditional
and widely accepted concepts can also give rise to constitutionally recog-
nized expectations. 4' Traditional legal concepts such as abandonment
of unused property and forfeiture of objects used in committing a crimi-
nal offense have been accepted by the Court as defining a property
owner's reasonable expectations. As a result, the Court has upheld state
statutes specifying the circumstances under which a forfeiture4 2 or aban-
donment 43 would occur because the statutes did not deprive the prop-
erty owner of a right which he reasonably could have considered to be
constitutionally guaranteed.4 4
Although one might argue that additional sources of expectations
should be recognized,4 5 the use of expectations as the foundation for
constitutional property law generally seems to be an acceptable method
of analysis, which finds legitimacy both in the nature of constitutional
Bill of Rights-e.g., the general warrant/writ of assistance. Thus, in interpreting the enumer-
ated provisions, the Court often turns to the underlying, broader interests sought to be pro-
tected by the framers and ratifiers. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 591 n.33
(1980) ("[T]his Court has not simply frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement
practices that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's passage."); Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1978); General Motors Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429
U.S. 338, 355 (1977). In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977), the Court made this
methodology explicit: "What we do know is that the framers were men who focused on the
wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth Amendment to safeguard fundamental val-
ues which would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth." See also Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (referring to the purposes of the
takings clause as a compelling factor in fashioning current law). The ironic result of the
contrary approach was noted in Hamilton, Propery-Accordng to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864, 880
(1932): "Against an unplanned and undirected industrialism, and its imminent hazards to
life, liberty, and property, we have no constitutional rights. But . . . we have adequate safe-
guards against the resort by any state to the kind of stuff the Stuart Kings used to pull."
41. See Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1984) (historic concepts as negating
expectation of privacy in open fields); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441 (taking found based on "histori-
cally-rooted expectation"). The conservative bias of this approach is inescapable. Present
concepts which perpetuate traditional views may be easier to identify and support, but they
are not necessarily more indicative of present social consensus, which represents an amalgam
of traditional and emerging ideas and values. Cf Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1980, at 83, 90 (1980) (tradition as source of Burger
Court rulings involving sex and the family).
42. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-90 (1974).
43. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 526-30 (1982).
44. To the same effect is Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441, treating traditional (late nineteenth and
early twentieth century) case law in the takings area as creating in the property owner an
"historically-rooted expectation" which the constitution should protect.
45. See supra notes 40-41.
[VOL. 43:518
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE BALANCE
adjudication and the nature of property. To a large extent, property is
itself a form of expectation. In Bentham's words, it is "the expectation
of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we are said to possess,
in consequence of the relation in which we stand towards it." 6 In deter-
mining whether an interest or claim is property, the expectations inher-
ent in the interest must be examined.4 7 Recent Supreme Court cases
involving property often cite Justice Holmes' admonition that "[t]he life
of the law has not been logic. It has been experience."4 8 The national
experience in regard to property is embodied in that collection of com-
mon understandings and mutual expectations "upon which people rely
in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined."4 9
Accordingly, defining reasonable expections has been the starting point
for the Burger Court in defining those property interests that are consti-
tutionally protected.5"
The setting of constitutional rights analysis also bespeaks the ap-
46. 1 J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE 137 (Hil-
dreth trans. Dumont ed. 1840) (1st ed. London 1789).
47. This methodology can be seen not only in the "new property" cases such as those
cited supra note 35, but also quite clearly in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979). The issue was whether assertion of the federal navigation servitude over a formerly
private lake now connected with navigable water by a channel constructed as part of a pri-
vate marina amounted to an unconstitutional taking. With reference to the digging of the
channel, the Court stated:
We have not the slightest doubt that the Government could have refused to
allow such dredging on the ground that it would have impaired navigation in the
bay, or could have conditioned its approval of the dredging on the petitioners'
agreement to comply with various measures that it deemed appropriate for the pro-
motion of navigation. But what petitioners now have is a body of water that was
private property under Hawaiian law, linked to navigable water by a channel
dredged by them with the consent of the Government. While the consent of indi-
vidual officials representing the United States cannot "estop" the United States, it
can lead to the fruition of a number of expectancies embodied in the concept of
"property"--expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the Government must con-
demn and pay for before it takes over the management of the land owner's property.
Id. at 179 (citation omitted).
48. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 177; Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 457 (1979) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1923).
49. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 179;
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). This approach to
defining constitutional property is consistent with the analysis used by the Court in determin-
ing whether an existing procedure for deprivation of life, liberty, or property comports with
due process: "'its effect must be judged in the light of its practical application to the affairs of
men as they are ordinarily conducted.'" Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451 (1982) (quot-
ing North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925)).
50. See cases cited supra note 48. In his concurring opinion in O'Bannon v. Town Court
Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), Justice Blackmun asserted that an approach that de-
fines expectations in terms of "reason and shared perceptions" reflects the "unremarkable
reality that reasonable legal rules themselves comport with reasonable expectations." d. at
797 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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propriateness of inquiry into expectations. If a property interest is
deemed to be of fundamental stature, it will have the capacity to out-
weigh duly enacted legislative measures. Thus, the immediate, particu-
lar will of the people is overridden by the underlying will of the people
that the given property interest should be protected against democratic
majorities.5" Through expectations analysis the Court ensures that the
protection of a particular property interest reflects the continuing un-
derlying will of the people.52
From the above sources, then-constitutional provisions and their
penumbras, traditional and widely shared property concepts3-the
Court has identified a congeries of property-related expectations that
define the scope of constitutional property. Discussions of property in
recent case law seem to relate protected expectations to four basic socie-
tal values associated with property: autonomy, privacy, the opportunity
to recoup investments made in the property, and physical control (pos-
session).54 The remainder of this Article will explore the Court's treat-
ment of each of these constitutionally protected property interests to
51. See Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1410-12 (1974) (discussing
judicial review of statutes regulating private rights for the public good).
52. One branch of constitutional scholarship holds that the content of constitutional pro-
tections must be determined by the intent of those who drafted and/or ratified the provision,
with subsequent changes in the popular will to be addressed through the amendment process.
See, e.g., Berger, Paul Brest's Brief for an Imperial Judicia9y, 40 MD. L. REV. 1, 24-31 (1981).
Others, however, assert that the Constitution must reflect present mores and conditions rather
than those held in colonial times, and that the courts must bear primary responsibility for the
adaptation. See, e.g., Brest, The MiSconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV.
204, 228-29, 237-38 (1980); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 pas-
sin (1981).
53. In cases defining the "new property," the Court appears to use positive law and con-
tract as the exclusive sources for constitutionally recognized expectations. See, e.g., Leis v.
Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1979) (per curiam); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1976).
However, these cases are not concerned with identifying constitutional property in the sense
that the term is used here. The "new property" cases determine whether an entitlement
constitutes property at all, such that it can qualify for basic procedural and rationality re-
view. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Thus, just as state law determines whether a
certain expectation as to land is legally protected such that it might be termed property, state
law is also used to determine whether a particular expectation in a job or government benefit
is legally protected to the extent that it might appropriately be classified as property. That
there is a property interest does not mean that there is a priority (here, "constitutional")
property interest capable of overriding the interest in democracy or other fundamental consti-
tutional values. This determination requires the additional analysis set forth in the text.
54. These three interests are, of course, in many instances closely related. The relation-
ship between autonomy and privacy-the freedom to make choices and the freedom to pre-
vent others from knowing or seeing one's choices-is so close that the Court generally fails to
distinguish the two concepts. Henkin, supra note 51, at 1424-25. Further, a landowner's abil-
ity to realize on his investment is intimately related to the scope of his autonomy regarding
the use of the property and its management. In a competitive economy, privacy concerning
these choices may also influence profitability.
[VOL. 43:518
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE BALANCE
determine the scope of the fundamental property interests which can
evoke heightened judicial scrutiny.
II. THE AUTONOMY INTEREST
Early in this century, a list of the protected property-related expec-
tations would have featured prominently a broad-based autonomy: an
inherent liberty to make decisions concerning activities on or affecting
the property without government interference.5 5 In the 1920's and 30's
the Supreme Court struck down numerous ameliorative business regula-
tions in favor of property and contract rights.5 6 The regulations held to
be unconstitutional included laws governing the conditions of employ-
ment,5 7 the quality of manufactured goods,5" and the pricing of various
goods and services.59
Reacting to the depression and its effect on the public perceptions
of the role of government in economic activities,60 the Court abandoned
its prior reification of property autonomy, at least with respect to busi-
ness property. Instead, the Court adopted a view that property becomes
"clothed with a public interest," and thus subject to the police power
when used in a way that affects the public.6 1 One's expectation of au-
tonomy in property that affects the public must encompass an expecta-
tion that government may regulate the use of the property.62 Thus,
such regulation does not deprive the property holder of any constitu-
tional property right. These limitations on the property holder's reason-
able expectations are merely extensions of the traditional notion
embodied, for instance, in nuisance law, that property does not bestow
the right to use the resource in a way harmful to others.63 Sic utere luo ut
55. W. SCOTT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY
FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 137-58 (1977).
56. See P. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 41-67, 128-69 (1972).
57. Eg., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 557 (1923) (minimum wage law for
women).
58. K.g., Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402, 415 (1926) (law prohibiting use of shoddy
in bedding materials).
59. Eg., Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 357 (1928) (employment agency fees); "yson. &
Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445 (1927) (prices charged
by ticket scalpers).
60. See P. MURPHY, supra note 56, at 154-56.
61. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (upholding state-imposed price con-
trols on milk); id. at 533 (reviving decisional theory used in nineteenth century casc such as
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877)).
62. Id at 534.
63. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 101-02; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 571-612 (4th ed. 1971).
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ah'enum non laedas.6 4
The passage of time since these cases were decided has increased the
extent to which an expectation of government intervention is imputed
to the property owner. The principle that property clothed with a pub-
lic interest may be regulated has itself become part of the legal tradition.
The Court acknowledged the effect on a property owner's expectations
of continued acceptance and restatement of a legal principle in Green v.
Lindd-_y, 65 a case concerned with the adequacy of posted notice of federal
proceedings:
It is, of course, reasonable to assume that a property owner will
maintain superintendence of his property, and to presume that
actions physically disturbing his holdings will come to his at-
tention . . . . The frequent restatement of this rule impresses
upon the property owner the fact that a failure to maintain
watch over his property may have significant legal conse-
quences for him, providing a spur to his attentiveness, and a
consequent reinforcement to the empirical foundation of the
principle.6 6
The use of the "clothed with a public interest" principle to justify
extensive government intervention into business property has been well
established in constitutional doctrine since 1934.67 What is noteworthy
in the opinions of the Burger Court is not its continued use of the princi-
ple in that context, but its apparent application of the "clothed with a
public interest" concept to residential property as well. In Anglo-Amer-
ican tradition, the home has always been regarded as an inherently pri-
vate place' in which one conducts inherently private activities. 69 Thus
it might be expected that the principles applicable to a home qua home
would differ from those applied to a business establishment.7" Although
the case law is not fully developed, the decisions to date indicate a nota-
64. "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1238 (5th ed. 1979).
65. 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
66. Id. at 451-52.
67. The general rule arising from Nebbz~z, that duly enacted state laws are consistent with
due process so long as reasonably related to a legitimate state interest, has been repeated so
often, see, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331 (1981); Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84-85 (1980); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955),
that modern cases challenging business regulation rarely allege property infringement, in-
stead pursuing other claims. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490
(1981); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
68. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
69. A home is the place where one sleeps, "eats, bathes, reads, visits, and rests, where one
throws off the cares of business and surrenders to his desire for creature comforts and human
associations." Jakeway v. John V. Bauer Co., 218 A.D. 302, 304, 218 N.Y.S. 193, 195 (1926).
70. A home that is serving as an office or place of employment might be treated differ-
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ble consistency between the principles applicable to autonomy in resi-
dential and nonresidential premises.
Two cases involving state regulation of household composition are
noteworthy. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the Court upheld an ordi-
nance zoning an entire village for single-family dwellings and defining
"family" as no more than two unrelated, or an unlimited number of
related, persons living together as a single housekeeping unit.7" Thus,
the resident property owner's choice of living companions was circum-
scribed severely. Rejecting without discussion an allegation that the or-
dinance violated rights of privacy,7 2 the Court upheld the ordinance
using language essentially identical to that found in cases involving busi-
ness regulation.73 A few years later in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the
Court struck down an ordinance limiting occupancy in a single-family
zone to particular configurations of related individuals."4 The plurality
decision relied not on any autonomy interest in the home, but on an
interest described as "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life." 75 Nor did the dissenters acknowledge that any consti-
tutionally protected property right had been affected. Only Justice Ste-
vens' concurring opinion argued that the right of a property owner to
determine the internal composition of his household is a basic property
right protected by the Constitution.7 6 One of the dissenters stated that
this argument had been rejected in Village of Belle Terre.7 7 These two
cases suggest that, unless a fundamental liberty interest is implicated,
ently from a home being used only as a residence. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 479-80
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
71. 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974).
72. Id at 7-8. In modern Supreme Court doctrine, such protection as is provided to au-
tonomy is generally under the label of "privacy." Henkin, supra note 51, at 1424-25.
73. 416 U.S. at 8 (prevention of arbitrariness, rational relationship to a permissible state
objective).
74. 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
75. Id. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
The protected interest thus was a form of relational privacy/autonomy rather than territorial
privacy/autonomy. The Moore holding reflects the Court's present approach to autonomy in
general. Rather than acknowledge the existence of broad areas of autonomy from which state
intervention is barred, the Court tends to confine protected autonomy to narrow realms, spe-
cifically tailored to the circumstances of the case at hand. These protected areas of autonomy
are collectively termed the constitutional right to "privacy." See, e.g., Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973). Because
of its inherently private nature, it might be expected that various zones of privacy would
relate to the home. However, there is a significant difference between protecting a general in-
home autonomy and a clustering of specific areas of protected autonomy in the home.
76. 431 U.S. at 518-20 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens regarded the ordinance
as an uncompensated taking. Id. at 521.
77. Id. at 535 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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residential autonomy may be restricted by the state with no greater con-
stitutional implications than are raised by regulation of a business.
In aligning the law of residential autonomy with that applicable to
business premises, the Court may have been responding once again to
the traditional legal principle that property rights may be limited to the
extent they affect the public. Activities within the home that affect the
public have long been subject to the sanction of the criminal laws.7" For
instance, serious crimes such as murder or rape are not insulated from
state authority merely because they occur within the home. More mun-
dane activities such as parties or sexual relations may be subjected to
state intervention under laws prohibiting fornication or disturbing the
peace. Nuisance law might also reach in-home activities. Thus the de-
gree of autonomy available within the home has never been complete.
Stanley v. Georgt' 79 might seem more protective of in-home auton-
omy, but actually is consistent with the principle that in-house activities
that affect the public are not constitutionally protected. In Stanley, the
Court held that a state law criminalizing the possession of obscene
materials in the home was an unconstitutional infringement on the pri-
vacy of the home."0 Although the Stanley Court emphasized the first
amendment aspects of the case,8 ' and the Burger Court subsequently
characterized the case as resting on the constitutional right to privacy,8 2
the outcome-and its contrast to the outcome in Village of Belle Terre-is
consistent with the rule enunciated in the 1930s in regard to business
property. When the property is used in a way that affects the public,
the holder's legitimate expectations must encompass the prospect of reg-
ulation. The use of a home to house an unduly large number of people
was regarded by the governing body of Belle Terre and the Supreme
Court as having the requisite public effects.8 3 The Court considered the
possession and perusal of pornographic materials in the home to have no
public effect; accordingly, the in-home activity was constitutionally
protected. 4
The Court's holdings in this area indicate that the autonomy inter-
78. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.24 (1980).
79. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
80. Id. at 565.
81. Id. This approach is typical of the Warren Court. The present Court would probably
rest the opinion on a property-related privacy interest, see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 66 (1973), if, indeed, it would reach the same result at all.
82. Pans Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 66.
83. Vlage of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9.
84. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566-67. Any public effects arising from such perusal must
derive from the materials' effects on the mind of the peruser. The first amendment implica-
tions of using such effects as an entree into the home may distinguish this case from others in
which a state legislature has determined the existence of public effects. On the other hand, it
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est in property does not impede the state from restricting activities on
the property that have a demonstrable effect on the public welfare, re-
gardless of whether the property is used for business or residential pur-
poses. The scope of activities having a public effect, however, should be
much narrower in the context of the home than in most economically
productive uses.
III. THE PRIVACY INTEREST
A. The Right to Exclude
A second societal value protected by the institution of property,
and one which has a solid place in Anglo-American tradition, is pri-
vacy. 5 Royal incursions on privacy provided a rallying point for the
American revolutionaries, 6 and gave rise to explicit constitutional limi-
tations: the third amendment limits the quartering of soldiers in private
homes,8 7 and the fourth guarantees the "right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." 8 The privacy concepts that were developed in
would seem appropriate for the Court to carefully scrutinize any assertion of public effects
when the state seeks to limit the individual's autonomy within the home.
85. Unlike the Court, I use the term "privacy" in the traditional sense of "freedom from
intrusion." In the property context, privacy denotes a freedom from physical intrusion famil-
iar in the tort law of "trespass" and in the property law of the "right to exclude." See, e.g., 3
H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 714 (3d ed. 1939).
86. See N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-78 (1937) (discussing reaction of colonists to writs of
assistance). The Declaration of Independence named among the wrongs done the colonies by
the Crown the quartering of soldiers in homes. John Adams attributed the origins of the
independence movement to discontent with official intrusions on privacy, exemplified by the
writ of assistance. The writ of assistance was a transferable document issued to customs of-
ficers and authorizing them "in the day time to enter and go into the vaults cellars ware-
houses shops and other places where any prohibited goods wares or merchandizes or any
goods wares or merchandizes for which the customs or other duties shall not have been duly
and truly satisfied and paid lye concealed or are suspected to be concealed, according to the
true intent of the law to inspect and oversee and search for the said goods wares and mer-
chandizes .. " Thomas Hutchinson's Draft ofa Writ of Assitance, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN
ADAMS 144, 146 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965). The open-ended authority thus granted to
customs officers was often abused and sorely resented by the colonists. Said Adams: "I do say
in the most solemn manner, that Mr. Otis's oration against the Writs of Assistance breathed
into this nation the breath of life. [He] was a flame of fire! Every man of a crowded audience
appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take arms against Writs of Assistance. Then
and there was the first scene of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and
there the child Independence was born." 10 C. ADAMS, THE LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 276 (1856).
87. "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of
the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. CONST.
amend. III.
88. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
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the context of the express provisions have spawned broader substantive
rights cognizable under the due process and takings clauses.8 9 Nonethe-
less the specific prohibitions of the third and fourth amendment thus
provide the textual source for a fundamental interest in territorial pri-
vacy. The zones of privacy explicitly created by the third and fourth
amendments have been both expanded and restricted by the Court,90
relying on penumbras,9 1 underlying values, 92 and tradition.93 Most im-
portantly, the scope of protected privacy interests has been expanded to
include commercial as well as residential property. 94
The language of the express provisions is particularly solicitous of
the privacy of the home, and accordingly, the Court is similarly solici-
tous of residential privacy in interpreting the broader fundamental in-
terest. Privacy is recognized as a primary value sought in a home, "the
one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the
tribulations of their daily pursuits.' 95 Pre-constitutional American and
English legal traditions also support a fundamental right to residential
privacy.9
6
The importance that the Burger Court attaches to the residential
privacy interest is noticeable in cases upholding against first amendment
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
89. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980) (not all
rights to exclusion are so essential to value of property as to require compensation); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) (recognizing right to exclude others as a
compensable property right under the takings clause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at
485-86 (right to marital privacy derived from, among others, due process clause).
90. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980).
91. The concept of penumbras was most explicitly articulated in Justice Douglas' major-
ity opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The opinion gave the right to
privacy infringed by state laws banning contraceptives a territorial basis, asking, "Would we
allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the mar-
riage relationship." Id. at 485-86.
92. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 585, 591 n.33 (privacy interest recognized in
many settings); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1978) (protecting commer-
cial buildings against warrantless search because individual has basic privacy interest).
93. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-90 (1974) (forfei-
ture of object used by lessee in commission of crime not violative of lessor's constitutional
rights as such objects historically have been subject to forfeiture).
94. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 311-12; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,
543 (1967).
95. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
96. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 597. The freedom of one's home, embodied in
the adage that "a man's house is his castle," was said by John Adams to be ' "one of the most
essential branches of English liberty.'" Id at 597 (quoting 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS
142 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965)).
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challenge laws viewed as protective of the privacy interest in the home.9 7
Approving a law enabling a person to require that a mailer remove his
name from its mailing list, 98 the Court stated that "to hold less would
tend to license a form of trespass."99 Similarly, in a later case, the Court
upheld a Federal Communications Commission order that a radio sta-
tion "could have been the subject of adminstrative sanctions" for an
afternoon broadcast of a monologue containing "indecent" language. 10
A primary consideration in the Court's rejection of a first amendment
challenge to the order was that "[p]atently offensive, indecent material
presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but
also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left
alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder."' 0 '
In a third case, the residential privacy interest occupied the other
side of the balance, and again it prevailed. In Payton v. New York, the
Court invalidated state statutes authorizing police officers to make a
warrantless felony arrest in a private dwelling,' °2 while reaffirming ear-
lier case law allowing warrantless arrests in a public place."0 3 The Court
distinguished these two situations on the basis of the suspect's interest in
the sanctity of his home, and noted that the " 'physical entry of the
house is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amend-
ment is directed.' "104 The Payton holding was extended in United States
v. Karo,' °5 in which the Court held that the fourth amendment requires
a warrant to be obtained before the police can monitor an electronic
tracking device (beeper) placed on a movable object which enters a pri-
97. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), also involved a first amendment challenge to a
law protecting residential privacy, though the state-supported privacy interest did not prevail
in that case. The state law, which exempted labor and certain other types of picketing from a
general ban on picketing a residence, was invalidated on equal protection grounds. Both
majority and separate opinions, however, indicated the acceptability of a nondiscriminatory
ban on residential picketing. It is interesting that in this case the Justices saw implicated a
significant residential privacy interest even though no physical intrusion on private property
was involved. Id. at 471.
98. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970). Under the stat-
ute, any householder who received advertisements that offered for sale "matter which the
addressee in his sole discretion believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative"
could give notice to the Postmaster General requesting that he order the sender to refrain
from further mailings to the householder and to delete his name from all mailing lists owned
or controlled by the sender. 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a), quoted in Rowan, 397 U.S. at 729-30.
99. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737.
100. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 730 (1978).
101. Id. at 748.
102. 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
103. See id at 590-601.
104. Id. at 585 (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1971)).
105. 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3303 (1984).
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vate residence.' 6 Karo modified prior case law which permitted the
warrantless monitoring of electronic tracking devices.1°7 These cases
demonstrate that residential privacy merits a high priority in constitu-
tional adjudication. Indeed, the Court has described its attitude toward
residential privacy as one of "reverence."'
Although the Court recently stated that "the expectation of privacy
that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs
significantly from the sanctity accorded the individual's home,"'0 9 the
case law indicates that the privacy interest in commercial property also
has a high priority. The principles used to determine the permissibility
of government intrusions in the commercial context are virtually identi-
cal to those used in the residential context." 0 Moreover, in takings cases
the Court has been highly solicitous of the property owner's right to
exclude third parties from business property. Characterizing the right
to exclude as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property,""' the Court in one such case
stated that "a physical invasion is a government invasion of a particu-
larly serious character.""' 2 Governmentally mandated intrusions on
commercial as well as residential property are permissible, if at all, only
if temporary and limited in nature." 3 These criteria are reminiscent of
the overbreadth standard attached to "preferred" first amendment
rights. "4 The statements and holdings of the Court thus support a con-
clusion that constitutional property is implicated by a government-au-
106. The Court observed: "The monitoring of an electronic device such as a beeper is, of
course, less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does reveal a critical fact about the inte-
rior of the premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could
not have otherwise obtained without a warrant." Id. at 3303-04.
107. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (beeper revealed nothing that could
not have been permissibly observed with the naked eye).
108. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958).
109. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981). It is appropriate that the privacy
interest in commercial property be accorded less weight than in residential property. Unlike
the home, business premises are not mentioned in the fourth amendment. Nor do the type of
intimate personal activities that the right of territorial privacy was designed to protect char-
acteristically take place on business premises. To the extent that they do, the privacy right
should reside in the actor rather than the business entity itself. The business entity has an
interest in privacy primarily as a means to enhance its ability to generate revenue; hence, this
interest should be analyzed using principles applicable to the investment interest rather than
the interest in personal privacy. Nevertheless, the Court seems to have adopted the latter
approach.
110. See infta notes 137-67 and accompanying text.
111. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979), quoted in Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
112. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
113. Id. at 434; Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 545 (1972).
114. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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thorized intrusion onto any type of premises." 5
In contrast, the Court has held that an intrusion onto undeveloped
land does not restrict fundamental property rights." 6 The Court re-
jected the notion that a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy
could arise from the posting of "no trespassing" signs, the erection of
fences, or from other indicia of the possessor's desire for privacy."'
Rather, the Court focused on traditional legal concepts differentiating
the home and its immediate environs from "open fields,"" 8 on the type
of activities that normally occur outdoors, and on the accessibility of
outdoor activities to public view."9 The Court found that there can be
no reasonable expectation of privacy in undeveloped land, and hence,
the fundamental right to privacy is not violated by intrusions on such
land.
B. Invitees
Constitutional restrictions on government intrusions always have
been limited to situations in which the property owner does not consent;
thus, the scope of the constitutional property interest does not encom-
pass protection against intrusion by invitees. The invitee exception,
long established in fourth amendment adjudication, 2 0 also permeates
the Court's property-related decisions arising in other contexts. In
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,'2 ' for example, the Court rejected a
property owner's claim that state law prohibiting the owner of a large
shopping center from excluding persons who were conducting orderly
speech and petition activities offended the takings clause. The Court's
115. Of course, not all intrusions implicate privacy interests of equal priority. As noted,
the Court has stated that residential privacy has a higher priority than commercial. Donovan
v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981). It has also asserted repeatedly that the priority is
higher when the purpose of the intrusion is to search for evidence of criminal activity. E.g.,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 278 (1973); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
116. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741-42 (1984).
117. Id. at 1741.
118. Id. at 1742. The area immediately surrounding the home, referred to at common law
as the curtilage, encompasses that area to which the intimate activities associated with the
home are likely to extend. It is generally accorded the same degree of protection as the home
itself. Id. An "open field" is "any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage.
An open field need be neither 'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are used in common speech."
Id. n. 11. The implications of the Court's inclusion of "unoccupied" areas in the definition of
an open field are uncertain.
119. Id. at 1741-42. The Court noted that even isolated portions of an "open field" may be
viewed from the air.
120. Eg., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (no fourth amendment
violation when consent given to entry).
121. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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opinion stressed that the shopping center was open to the public, 22 and
concurring Justice Marshall rejected any possibility of a meaningful
claim to a right to privacy under such circumstances. 1"3 The rejection
of a privacy interest in relation to invitees is also apparent in the Court's
holdings that non-disruptive employee union activities on the em-
ployer's property cannot be barred by the employer/property holder' 2 4
and that the fourth amendment does not shield an employer from obser-
vation by employees.125 By opening the premises to employees, the em-
ployer yields certain property rights, particularly its expectation of
privacy in relation to its employees.
2 6
Nonetheless, a property owner retains a reasonable expectation of
privacy in areas of activity or portions of the premises that are outside
the scope of the invitation, and intrusions into these areas by the invitee
will violate the owner's fundamental privacy interest. As in the law of
torts, t 2 privacy continues to affect the areas outside the physical scope
of the invitation. Thus, portions of the premises not open to the relevant
class of persons are constitutionally protected against intrusion. 2  The
state may not open the storage areas or business offices of a store to
customers, or the executive suite of a corporation to employees who are
normally excluded, and government inspectors of business premises may
not, without a warrant, enter areas that are not open to the public. 29
Activities of the invitee that disrupt the use of the premises also are
122. Id. at 83. This factor is stressed as having been determinative in a subsequent discus-
sion of the Aruneyard case contained in Loretto. 458 U.S. at 434.
123. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 94.
124. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 507 (1978); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S.
556, 572-73 (1978). These activities have been interpreted as coming under the protective
umbrella of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
125. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 426 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1978). Similarly, a conspiratorial
property owner is not protected from an invitee's transmission of conversations to the police
via hidden microphone, though he can complain if the hidden microphone was surrepti-
tiously planted on an unsuspecting guest. United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3304 n.4
(1984).
126. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 314.
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 169 (1965) (consent to enter portion of land
does not create privilege to enter any part of land).
128. See NLRB v. Visceglia, 498 F.2d 43, 49-50 (3d Cir. 1974) (employees assigned to one
building do not have right of access to separate building); cf. Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB,
200 F.2d 375, 380-81 (7th Cir. 1953) (non-employees may be barred from employee restau-
rant); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. NLRB, 443 F.2d 52, 56-57 (3d Cir. 1971) (off-duty employ-
ees may be barred from production areas).
129. See, e.g., Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) (fourth
amendment asserted in regard to locked liquor storeroom); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. at 309-10, 324 (warrant needed for passage from customer service area into work area of
electrical and plumbing installation business). "[A]dministrative entry, without consent,
upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the publc may only be compelled
through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure." See v.
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beyond the scope of the invitation. Thus in Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins,' 30 while the Court held that state law may require large shop-
ping centers to permit orderly expressive activities on the premises, sev-
eral Justices emphasized in concurring opinions that the holding did not
apply where serious interferences with business activity could be
shown. 131
The concept that the scope of the invitation is limited to non-dis-
ruptive activities is apparent also in two labor cases. In Beth Israel Hospi-
tal v. NLRB, the Court upheld an NLRB ruling that restricted the areas
in which employees could engage in union activities. 132 Such activities
were permitted in the hospital cafeteria, although it was used by visitors
and patients, because any interference with cafeteria operations did not
affect the primary functions of the hospital.1 33 Similarly, in Eastex, Inc.
v. NLRB, the Court upheld an agency order requiring the employer to
allow employees to distribute, in nonworking areas and on nonworking
time, a union newsletter which contained material unrelated to the em-
ployees' association with the union.' 3 4 In rejecting the employer's prop-
erty-based arguments, the Court cited the employer's failure to show
any interference with production or discipline, 31 stating "the [NLRB] is
entitled to view the intrusion by employees on the property rights of
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967), quoted in Colonnade Catering Corp., 397 U.S. at 76
(emphasis added).
130. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
131. "Even large establishments may be able to show that the number or type of persons
wishing to speak on the premises would create a substantial annoyance to customers that
could be eliminated only by elaborate time, place and manner restrictions." Id at 96 (Powell,
J., concurring in part); accord id at 95 (White, J., concurring in part). The majority opinion
also stressed that "There is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from prohibiting
this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shopping
center." Id at 83.
132. 437 U.S. 483, 504-07 (1978). Statements and holdings in the labor cases sometimes
seem more protective of property than in other cases. Compare Central Hardware Co. v.
NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972) (private parking lot "open to the public" does not assume
attributes of public property), with Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84-85
(1980) (state may regulate private property that is open to the public). The labor cases,
however, involve the Court in interpreting a federal statute, the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA). While the statute must be interpreted so as to allow only those intrusions per-
mitted by the Constitution, the Court does not in these cases purport to be pushing the Con-
stitution to the limit. Thus any entries allowed by the Court are presumptively
constitutional; however, that an entry was disallowed under the NLRA does not conclusively
establish that it was constitutionally barred.
133. Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. at 507.
134. 437 U.S. 556, 572-73 (1978).
135. Id. at 572. The Court was following an earlier ruling in Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), which was similar in all relevant facts except that in Eastex the
literature addressed matters over which the employer did not have control. Beth Israel Hlosp.,
437 U.S. at 570-72.
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their employer as quite limited in this context as long as the employer's
management interests are adequately protected."'
136
C Implied Consent
In its early years, the Burger Court recognized another exception to
the constitutional right to exclude: If a property owner accepts a gov-
ernment benefit or privilege conditioned on admission of specified per-
sons, then entry by those persons does not impinge on the owner's
constitutional rights. The two best known cases in this area are Colon-
nade Catering Corp. v. United States'37 and United States v. Btswell, 38 which
involved government attempts to inspect premises on which liquor and
guns, respectively, were sold. In each case the Court upheld a statute
permitting warrantless searches, noting the historical pervasiveness of
regulation of such businesses, including licensing requirements.139 The
failure to require a warrant was based on a theory of implied consent.
"[B]usinessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enter-
prises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade. . . .The
businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions
placed upon him."' 4 °
A related implied consent theory appears in the controversial case
of Wyman v. James,'4 ' which upheld mandatory caseworker visits to wel-
136. Id. at 574. Similar principles emerge from a series of cases determining whether vari-
ous communicative activities may be barred from public property. The Court has drawn a
distinction between public property that serves as a public forum, such as streets and parks,
and that which does not. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948,
954-55 (1983). In regard to the latter, the state may restrict expressive activities to those
compatible with the intended purpose of the property, including restrictions based on subject
matter and speaker identity that would be clearly unconstitutional if applied to a public
forum. Id. at 955. Thus, during the 1970's the Court held that forms of speech that would
disrupt the operations of a military base, Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-40, (1976) (parti-
san political activities), a prison, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 133-
135 (1977) (hulk mailings, meetings, and solicitations on behalf of a prisoner's union), or a
city bus system, Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (political adver-
tising), could be barred. In Greer and Jones the restricted communicators were already law-
fully on the premises. See generally Note, A Unitary Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to
Publily Owned Property, 35 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1982) (challenging system of differential treat-
ment of publicly owned property).
137. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
138. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
139. 397 U.S. at 75-77 (but holding that warrantless search that included forcible entry
violates fourth amendment); 406 U.S. at 315-17 (holding warrantless search of room pursuant
to firearms regulation statute does not violate fourth amendment).
140. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973) (explaining the holdings
in Colonnade Catering Corp. and Btswe/4, quoted in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312
(1978).
141. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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fare recipients' homes. The Court treated the welfare application as an
implied consent to entry by the caseworker, which was a statutory ad-
junct to the receipt of benefits.t 42 Thus, the implied consent idea has
been applied to limit the constitutional property interest in residential
as well as commercial premises.
These three cases involved the receipt of a government perqui-
site,' 43 application for which could be viewed as implying consent to the
subsequent visitations or inspections so long as actual or constructive
notice was imputable to the applicant. The most recent implied consent
case, however, did not involve an application and perquisite; rather, the
property owner merely was doing business in a regulated industry. '44 In
Donovan v. Dewey, the Court allowed warrantless inspections under a stat-
ute that specifically authorized them pursuant to a pervasive regulatory
program, where the regulations provided notice of the fact and nature of
periodic inspections.' 4 ' The regulatory scheme, the Court noted, should
itself cause the occupant of affected property to anticipate periodic in-
spections; thus, any expectation of privacy which might preclude an in-
spection is subjective and is not protected by the Constitution.1 46
The Dewey holding narrows the gap between the law governing ter-
ritorial privacy and that governing property autonomy: If property is
affected with a public interest, not only may government restrict the
owner's activities, but it may also intrude onto the premises without a
warrant to assure that its directives are being carried out.' 47 If carried
to its extreme, that analysis could spell the virtual demise of the fourth
142. Id. at 324; id. at 344-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
144. This expansion of the theory is consistent with the long-established principle that
"[t]he touchstone of public interest in any business, . . . clearly is not the enjoyment of any
franchise from the state." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 534 (1934).
145. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-05 (1981).
146. Id. at 599-603; f Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451-53 (1982) (effect of law on
expectations). Not only must the law specifically provide for inspections, Dewey, 452 U.S. at
599-600, it must be sufficiently specific in regard to such details as frequency and scope of
inspections to provide for "a predictable and guided federal regulatory presence," id. at 604.
Compare Dewey, 452 U.S. at 604 (frequency and scope are predictable), with Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (frequency and scope insufficiently detailed).
147. The idea that land uses affected with a public interest may be more readily intruded
upon finds support in case law outside the fourth amendment context as well. For instance,
the Court has upheld the power of the National Labor Relations Board to require that non-
employee union organizers be admitted to the premises if alternative means of communicat-
ing with employees are unavailable. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 548
(1972) (remanding case for consideration of whether such alternative means were available);
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (reversing NLRB order where
alternative means are available). Further, although the Court has consistently held govern-
ment-authorized intrusions on property to violate the takings clause, the analysis under which
it has done so relied heavily on other factors such as the extent of the economic impact.
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amendment's warrant requirement. The Court made clear, however,
that it did not intend to enunciate so broad a principle. The implied
consent theory is subject to certain limitations that are spelled out ex-
pressly in Dewey, or are implicit either in related case law or in the im-
plied consent theory itself.
First, the legislation must provide adequate notice of the fact and
nature of the intrusion. Otherwise, the act of commencing or continu-
ing to operate an affected business cannot reasonably be construed as
acceptance of the intrusion as a condition of doing business, and consent
cannot be implied. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (FM-
SHA),t 48 under which the Dewey inspection was performed, specified the
frequency, purpose, and scope of inspections.14 9 In contrast, the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) SO involved in Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc., was unspecific as to those matters.S' The Court disallowed
warrantless inspections in Barlow's because the statutory notice of poten-
tial inspections was an insufficient basis upon which to premise con-
sent. "'5 2 The Barlow-s Court also noted that since OSHA applied on its
face to all businesses in interstate commerce, yet clearly did not contem-
plate inspections of all businesses, the statute did not provide sufficient
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 262-63 (1946). An intrusion having a lesser impact could be upheld under this analysis.
Finally, the importance of these principles is underscored by statements made in Ca-
rey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), in which the Court held unconstitutional, on equal protec-
tion grounds, an Illinois statute banning picketing of residences, with exceptions for "peaceful
picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute or the place of holding a
meeting or assembly on premises commonly used to discuss subjects of general public inter-
est." Id. at 457 (quoting ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 21.1-2 (1977)). In discussing the first
amendment implications of the statute, the three dissenting Justices opined that a total ban
on residential picketing, acknowledged by all to further the legitimate goal of protecting the
privacy of the home, might be unconstitutional as applied if "a resident has voluntarily used
his home for nonresidential uses in a way which reduces the resident's privacy interest, and
the person seeking to picket the home has no alternative forum for effectively airing the griev-
ance because it relates to the nonresidential use of the home. ... .Id at 479 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that statutory distinction was merely attempt to comply with these con-
stitutional requirements). As an example, they cited persons who operated businesses out of
their homes, such as a slum lord, with no reference to whether such businesses involved em-
ployees or other invitees into the home. Id at 480. Emphasis was placed on the nonresiden-
tial use itself as a "waiver" of privacy. But see id. at 487 n.5 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(criticizing an example used by the majority "since that act does not involve the voluntary
admission of strangers into the home for some nonresidential purposes"). The majority also
indicates that the distinction should not turn entirely on whether persons have been invited
onto the premises. Id. at 468-69.
148. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1983).
149. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603-04.
150. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1983).
151. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 322-24 (1978); see also Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. at 600-01.
152. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 321-23.
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notice to a particular owner that he would be inspected, and that there-
fore, the owner had no expectation of inspection. 153
Second, the intrusion must be limited to vindicating the public in-
terest with which the property is affected. Any official acts that go be-
yond that objective exceed the scope of the implied consent. Thus, in
Carey v. Brown the dissenters noted that a nonresidential use of a dwelling
does not necessarily justify picketing unrelated to the nonresidential
use.
Perhaps most important is the requirement, derived more from
fourth amendment history than from a theory of implied consent,
1 5 5
that the discretion of the inspecting officer be significantly limited. His-
torically, one of the most obnoxious features of the general warrant and
the writ of assistance, abuse of which in colonial times provided the im-
petus for the fourth amendment, was their unlimited scope.' 56 The of-
ficer holding either the writ or the warrant could enter any premises and
search wherever he pleased for "uncustomed" or other indicated goods
or evidence. James Otis, whose early orations against the writ of assist-
ance inspired John Adams to the cause of independence,' 57 related an
instance in which a Mr. Justice Walley called before him one Mr. Ware,
a customhouse officer possessed of a writ of assistance, to answer for
some minor offense. "As soon as he had finished, Mr. Ware asked him if
he had done. He replied, 'Yes.' 'Well then,' said Mr. Ware, 'I will show
you a little of my power. I command you to permit me to search your
house for uncustomed goods.' And went on to search his house from the
garret to the cellar; and then served the constable in the same
manner."'
158
The fourth amendment provisions limiting the granting and
executing of warrants prevent the officer conducting the search from
exercising such wide discretion: "no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
153. Id at 313-14.
154. 447 U.S. at 484-86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The property owner/employer made
an argument of this sort in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978), asserting that the
National Labor Relations Act could not require it to permit distribution in the workplace of a
newsletter containing items other than official union business. The Court held that the
NLRB was not required to distinguish protected distributions on the basis of the content of
each distribution. Id. at 572-76.
155. The requirement may be linked to consent theory through the argument that no ra-
tional person would voluntarily consent if the inspector had unlimited discretion, and hence
consent cannot reasonably be implied.
156. See N. LASSON, supra note 86, at 45-46, 60. For an indication of the broad scope of the
writ, see supra note 86.
157. N. LAsSON, supra note 86, at 58-6 1.
158. Id. at 60 (quotation unattributed).
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describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." ''  If the Court allows a search or inspection to proceed without
a warrant, it looks for similar limitations on the discretion of the inspect-
ing officer. Thus, the Court rejected warrantless entries by OSHA in-
spectors and IRS revenue agents under statutes and regulations that
were open-ended as to the scope of the search. 60 In Dewey, however, the
Court regarded the scope of the inspections as sufficiently delineated.' 6 '
The need to limit the inspector's discretion suggests also that the
premises which the inspector will enter must be known-that is, ac-
knowledged by all-to be affected with the public interest to which the
legislation is directed. This does not mean that all must agree that the
condition or activity on the property affects the public, or with the legis-
lative response thereto. Rather, it must be undisputed that the condi-
tion which the legislature has determined affects the public, and which
demands regulation and confirmatory inspections, exists on the targeted
premises.'6 2 Without this prerequisite, the decision to intrude, whether
based on hunch, reasonable suspicion, or probable cause, vests excessive
discretion in the inspecting officer. Indeed, the selection of premises to
159. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
160. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323-24 & nn.21-22 (1978). The inspection
order involved in the case included among the subjects of the inspection " 'all other things
therein (including but not limited to records, files, papers, processes, controls and facilities)
bearing upon whether Barlow's, Inc. is furnishing to its employees employment and a place of
employment that are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to its employees, and whether Barlow's, Inc. is complying with
. . .' OSHA regulations." Id. at 324 n.22. See also G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429
U.S. 338, 357-58 (1977) ("Section 6331 . . . covers all defaults on all taxes, and we are unwill-
ing to hold that the mere interest in the collection of taxes is sufficient to justify a statute
declaring per se exempt from the warrant requirement every intrusion into privacy made in
furtherance of any tax seizure.").
161. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603-04 (1981) (distinguishing Marshall v. Barlows,
Inc.). In upholding mandatory visitations by welfare caseworkers, the Court also relied on the
limited scope of the intrusion. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 321 (1971).
162. In distinguishing Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), and
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), cases indicating the validity of warrantless
administrative inspections, from a random automobile search for aliens, the Court stated in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1973):
[I]n Colonnade and Biswell, the searching officers knew with certainty that the
premises searched were in fact utilized for the sale of liquor or guns. In the present
case, by contrast, there was no such assurance that the individual searched was
within the proper scope of official scrutiny-that is, there was no reason whatever to
believe that he or his automobile had even crossed the border, much less that he was
guilty of the commission of an offense.
See also Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1743 n. 13 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (In
determining whether there is reasonable expectation of privacy in certain premises, inquiry
should focus on uses to which premises are susceptible rather than use for which they are
actually employed, unless the actual use can be determined without violating the very pri-
vacy interest being asserted.).
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be searched was one of the primary areas of discretion that so offended
the colonial population, as the Ware anecedote illustrates.
Limiting the application of the implied consent theory to premises
known to be affected with the legislatively-indicated public interest ef-
fectively excludes searches intended to discover evidence of criminal ac-
tivity. In general, the commission of crimes or possession of evidence of
crime on certain premises is neither common knowledge nor revealed
upon request to the authorities. Indeed, the presumption of innocence
requires the inspector to presume that the premises do not harbor crimi-
nal activity. 6 3 Thus, an impartial decisionmaker must weigh the evi-
dence that supports criminal activity on certain premises, 164 a discretion
intended to be denied the inspector.
Although the Dewey principle might encompass intrusions into the
home in a limited range of situations,'65 it is unlikely the Court will
apply the principle to permit residential intrusion, largely because of
history and tradition. The Court in Dewey distinguished between resi-
dential and commercial premises,' 66 as does the language of the fourth
amendment itself. 6 7 With concern for privacy in the home conspicuous
both currently and at the time of ratification, 6 it is virtually inconceiv-
able that the Court would allow a warrantless intrusion into the home
based merely on authorizing legislation.
In summary, constitutional property encompasses a broad interest
in territorial privacy. Indeed, there are indications that privacy merits
163. Concealing evidence of criminal activity is itself a crime. See, e.g., R. PERKINS & R.
BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 558-59 (3d ed. 1982).
164. In his concurrence in Dewey, Justice Rehnquist criticized the holding of the majority,
stating: "I have no doubt that had Congress enacted a criminal statute similar to that in-
volved here-authorizing, for example, unannounced warrantless searches of property reason-
ably thought to house unlawful drug activity-the warrantless search would be struck down
under our existing Fourth Amendment line of decisions." 452 U.S. at 608 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's fears concerning the scope of the Dewey ruling were, as
demonstrated, unfounded.
165. Regulations of the home as structure (e.g., building codes), as land use (e.g., tradi-
tional zoning ordinances), or as tax source (e.g., property or income tax provisions) would be
too broadly applicable to provide the basis for an expectation of inspection. See supra note 153
and accompanying text. Further, the voluntariness of any consent that might be implied
from residential use of the premises is illusory given the necessity of shelter to human health
and safety. See generally Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) (pe-
nalizing exercise of constitutional right by withholding necessities of life impermissible);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1973) (effective consent must be
voluntary).
166. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
167. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . U.S. CONST. amend.
IV (emphasis added).
168. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
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the highest priority of any constitutional property interest. The prop-
erty owner is not protected, however, against entries to which he has
consented, either expressly or impliedly. Consent may be implied when
an owner or occupant has voluntarily sought some government benefit
that is conditioned on entry, or uses the property in a way that affects
the public so that entry has been deemed necessary by the legislature.
Consent is limited, however, to those portions of the premises and those
activities that are reasonably encompassed within the consent. If the
entry is authorized by statute such that consent is implied, the discretion
of the inspecting officer must be reasonably confined by restricting his
power to determine the site and scope of the inspection.
IV. THE INVESTMENT INTEREST
A constitutionally protected economic interest in property, referred
to here as the investment interest, has textual roots in the takings clause
of the fifth amendment: "nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation." This being the sole provision whereby
the Constitution expressly concerns itself with economic recompense for
government action, it may be inferred that the individual interest
sought to be safeguarded was economic in nature. 169 The meaning of
the clause was relatively clear as originally construed, and hence capa-
ble of generating fairly specific expectations in the property-holding
public: land or personal property has an economic value to its owner, a
value which must be compensated if the public requires governmental
appropriation of the land or personal property.170 This simple formula
was discarded by the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 7 ' the 1922
case which serves as the foundation of modern takings law with its state-
ment that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regu-
lation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."'' 72 Although
Pennsylvania Coal resembles earlier case law in that the complainant was
deprived of its entire economic interest in the property, 17 3 its language is
169. In Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2330-31 (1984), the Court held
that the "public use" limitation contained in the eminent domain/takings clause is coexten-
sive with the police power. Hence, the clause places no new restriction on government appro-
priation or limitation of property rights other than the requirement that compensation be
paid.
170. Eg., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664 (1887) (dicta); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,
80 U.S. 166, 177 (1871) (interpreting state constitution).
171. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
172. Id. at 415.
173. The challenged regulation forbade "the mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to
cause the subsidence of" land used in certain ways, including human habitation. Id. at 412.
The Court treated the regulation as totally barring the complainant from exercising its min-
eral interest in certain land, thus rendering that interest valueless. Id. at 413.
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not so limited, and the case has been widely interpreted as establishing
that the destruction of less than the total economic interest may consti-
tute a taking. 7 4 Indeed, it has been suggested that the provision might
operate whenever any portion of the investment interest is lost through
government action.175
A. Investment-backed Expectations
Despite the obvious need, guidance from the Court as to which of
these diverse interpretations would govern was not forthcoming until
the Burger Court undertook the task some sixty years later. As with
other property interests, the Court bases its interpretation of the invest-
ment interest on expectations, the fact of investment being a threshold
requirement for the reasonableness of any economic expectation. Thus,
the Court's analysis is keyed to whether the government has interfered
with the property holder's "reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions." '76 The requirement that protected expectations arise from an
investment ensures that only governmental interventions with a demon-
strable effect on the property holder's current economic situation are
affected. An owner has no constitutional right to uncertain gains he
hopes to derive from future uses.77
The Court's posture of limiting protected economic expectations to
174. See, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, &J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 141-211 (1973);
Michelman, supra note 17, at 1190-93 & n.53.
175. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 27-28. Ackerman's scientific adjudicator would
find a taking in such circumstances, but would then conduct a second inquiry to determine
whether, and in what amount, compensation was just. Id. at 28-29.
176. E.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 64 n.21 (1979); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). This phrase apparently was bor-
rowed from Michelman, supra note 17, at 1233. Michelman, arguing that a utilitarian or
fairness perspective requires compensation whenever a certain governmental effect on prop-
erty would demoralize the public, believed that this condition was met when the claimant
was deprived "of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expecta-
tion." Id.
177. The Court's response in Andrus v. Allard to an assertion that the complainants had
been deprived of future profits by the challenged federal law highlights this concern:
Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts
are not especially competent to perform. Further, perhaps because of its very uncer-
tainty, the interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compel-
ling than other property-related interests.
444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (citation omitted). Thus the constitutional inquiry in this area has
pertained to the existing use of the property at the time of the restriction, which the Court has
stated "must be regarded as [the owner's] primary expectation concerning the parcel." Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978). It is because of the lack of
investment by the recipient that the right to receive entitlements (new property) is not pro-
tected by the takings clause. See Note, Justice Rehnquist's Theor, of Property, 93 YALE L.J. 541,
543-44 (1984).
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those backed by an investment is consistent with its overall approach of
protecting only those expectations grounded on recognized sources such
as legal and cultural tradition. The investment requirement bears simi-
larity to certain aspects of John Locke's labor-desert theory of prop-
erty '7 Locke's ideas had substantial influence on the colonial political
theories underlying the Bill of Rights 17 9 and have continuing intuitive
appeal to the American public. 0 Beginning with the precept that God
has given the earth's resources to all mankind in common,""' Locke jus-
tified property interests in such resources by arguing that a person
gained a right to claim something as his by mixing his labor with it in
such a way as to make it more useful to mankind. Thus Locke's natural
right in property was limited to resources with which one had usefully
mixed one's labor.18
2
The Court's recognition of the labor-desert theory is most apparent
in Zacchhi v. Scripps-Howards Broadcastitg Co., a case in which the Court
upheld a performer's state-created "right of publicity" against a first
amendment challenge. The Court found the performer's economic in-
terest in his act to be a fundamental property right because "th[e] act is
the product of petitioner's own talents and energy . ,,1." The idea
that the Constitution protects only investment-backed expectations rep-
resents a capitalist adaption of the original Lockean idea: constitutional
property is recognized only to the extent that the owner has mixed his
investment with the land or other resource.' 8 4
178. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT $ 37,40 (T. Peardon ed. 1952).
179. W. SCOTT, supra note 55, at 53-54. Locke's property theories are evident in early
Supreme Court case law such as Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-91 (1823).
180. Locke's labor theory "is an idea which, once enunciated in the context of natural
rights theories of the seventeenth century, has seemed nearly inescapable and self-evident."
L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 32 (1977).
181. J. LOCKE, supra note 178, T$ 25-26.
182. See id. $1 27-30. This notion is also embodied in American law of adverse possession,
whereby title is involuntarily terminated in one and created in another due to the latter's
occupation and use of the land for a specified period. Locke's natural right in property was
limited in other ways. See infra note 185.
183. 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2874
(1984) (trade secret recognized as fundamental property right). The Court in Zacchini and
Monsanto was not itself creating a property right, but was holding that it was permissible for a
state to do so and that such property was of constitutional stature. Cf Deepsouth Packing Co.
v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 n.8 (1972) (inventor has no property right in his inven-
tion other than that granted by patent laws).
184. Cf Hamilton, supra note 40, at 870 ("When [the] distinctive character [of mercantile
capital] was no longer to be overlooked, the labor theory was made over and capital came to
be justified by the pain of abstinence involved in saving."). The Court's concept of "invest-
ment backed" expectations should encompass expectations based on investment of labor as
well as of money. No constitutional significance lies in the fact that a property holder did
something himself rather than paying someone else to to it. Cf Neponsit Property Owners'
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Possibly more influential than the labor-desert theory, which has
lost some of its philosophical underpinnings in the transition to modern
capitalism,"8 5 is the concept of vested rights. This traditional doctrine
arises from the fundamental legal principle that one may rely on the
state of the law at the time he acts, and if such acts are subsequently
made illegal, he will not be penalized. It has been relied on from time to
time by state courts to determine whether new zoning ordinances, build-
ing codes, or other land use regulations should be applied to land devel-
opments that have been commenced but are not completed.'8 6 If the
development has proceeded to the point that the owner's right to use the
land as planned has vested, application of the new and prohibitive ordi-
nance is constitutionally barred."8 7 Implicit in this theory is the idea
Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 258, 15 N.E.2d 793, 796 (1938) (promise to
pay for something to be done is legal equivalent of promise to do the thing oneself).
185. Locke's natural right to property in land was dependent upon three important pre-
requisites. First, one has a natural right only to land with which he or his servant has mixed
his labor. Thus, land not being beneficially used should not be the subject of property. This
limitation has less impact if capital is substituted for labor in the equation. Secondly, the
natural right is limited to land which the individual needs and can use, as there is no natural
right to waste the bounty of nature. J. LOCKE, supra note 178, 31. This limitation would be
significant only in a society with no commerce, as the ability to barter or sell the product of
the land over and above that needed by the individual for subsistence would prevent its being
wasted. Id 48. Most importantly, one's natural right to property in land was dependent
on the continued availability of as much and as good land for others. Id. 33. In colonial
America, this presented no problem, as a vast continent awaited those unable to secure land
on the eastern seaboard. With the passing of the frontier, however, there remained no un-
claimed land to satisfy this third condition to Locke's natural right.
186. A good discussion of vested rights theory in this context is found in Cunningham &
Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land Development Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625 (1978).
The vested rights theory contains at its core an even more fundamental legal principle-that
one may rely on the state of the law at the time he acts, and he will not be penalized if such
acts are subsequently made illegal. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting ex post
facto laws). In this context the term "ex post facto" law has been limited to a law "which
renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when committed."
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810). The detrimental reliance principle un-
derlying vested rights theory appears influential in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164 (1979). The Court made much of the fact that the developer had secured from the Corps
of Engineers a permit to construct a channel connecting its private pond with Maunalua Bay,
it not being mentioned at that time that such linkage would subject the pond to the federal
navigational servitude.
But what petitioners now have is a body of water that was private property under
Hawaiian law, linked to navigable water by a channel dredged by them with the
consent of the Government. While the consent of individual officials representing
the United States cannot "estop" the United States, . . . it can lead to the fruition
of a number of expectancies embodied in the concept of "property"-expectancies
that, if sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and pay for before it
takes over the management of the land owner's property.
444 U.S. at 179.
187. The concept of vested rights as connoting an interest protected by the Constitution is
found in scattered Supreme Court cases. E.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
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that until the owner invests in developing the land for a particular use,
there is no constitutionally protected right to use it in that way.
It would be an over-simplification to suggest that the current con-
stitutional property doctrine unquestioningly adopts the facile distinc-
tions of the vested rights theory. Nevertheless, recent opinions
demonstrate the continuing significance of the distinction between ex-
isting and contemplated uses in determining the degree of constitutional
protection.
B. Reasonable Expectations
An investment-backed expectation, then, relates to the existing use
of the property or its inherent economic value regardless of use. Not all
such expectations are protected, however; as with the other fundamental
property interests, the investment-backed expectation must be
reasonable.
The unreasonableness of an expectation of complete freedom from
government action affecting the property""' was made clear at the mo-
ment the Court expressed its willingness to expand the scope of pro-
tected economic interests in Pennsy/vania Coal. The Court stated,
"Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law,' i 9 a statement which the Court has repeated in re-
cent takings cases."o In Agins v. C"o of Tiburon, the Court reinforced this
idea, labeling as "incidents of ownership" the fluctuations in property
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32 (1978); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628 (1885). Its use
by the Court has never been widespread, however, as the term is generally regarded as devoid
of substantive content, expressing a conclusion rather than the means of reaching a conclu-
sion. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. at 628; Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 186, at 626-
28.
188. Cunningham and Kremer, in their article on vested rights, point out the impact on
expectations of modern building permit requirements:
When a development permit is required by law for all forms of development activ-
ity, apparently the requirement of government authorization totally preempts any
claim to an inherent right to develop the land without government authorization.
Because the salient charcteristic of most new permit systems is a broad delegation of
discretionary authority, the new permits will seldom be issued as of right but will
instead almost invariably be recognized as subject to highly subjective standards
and criteria. This widespread and, in many areas, long-standing requirement of a
permit has also changed the expectations of developers and landowners. The public
should be fully aware of the permit requirement, and cannot claim surprise or frus-
tration of a justified expectation of an unhindered inherent right to develop land.
Cunningham and Kremer, supra note 186, at 642.
189. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
190. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); accord Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980)
("It is well established that 'not every destruction or injury to property by governmental
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value resulting from governmental indecisiveness concerning condemna-
tion of the property.'91
The contention that a property owner has a protected right to re-
ceive gains that were anticipated at the time of investment also was deci-
sively rejected by the Court in Andrus v. Allard."'92 That case upheld a
federal law and accompanying regulations criminalizing the sale of arti-
facts containing the feathers of certain birds even if the artifacts pre-
dated the passage of the legislation. The artifacts were antique Indian
creations dating from 1800 to the early 1950's, and valued at up to
$7500 each.' 9 3 Although it was unlikely that the owner could otherwise
recover an amount even approaching his investment, the Court charac-
terized sale as merely "the most profitable use of appellees' property,"' 9 4
and held that the loss of anticipated gains did not give rise to a tak-
ing. '9 5 The term "gains" should not be construed to refer to amounts in
excess of the original investment, as there was no assurance that the Al-
lard complainants would be able to recover their original investment.
Indeed, the record supported the contrary proposition.' 9 6
1. Economic V'abzi v.-Complementing the Allard holding is the
Court's express rejection in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
of the diminution in value test:' 9 7 "Appellants concede that the deci-
sions . . .uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property
value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking'. . . and that the 'taking'
issue in these contexts is resolved by focusing on the uses the regulations
permit. '19 Thus the Court deflects the inquiry from the losses sus-
tained by the investor as not reflective of constitutionally protected ex-
pectations. The inquiry is instead directed toward that which is
permitted to the landowner under the regulatory scheme, the relevant
inquiry being whether the property is capable of "economically viable
action has been held to be a "taking" in the constitutional sense' ") (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960)).
191. 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980).
192. 444 U.S. 51, 64-66 (1979).
193. Appellee's Brief at 50-60 (Appendix: Answer to Defendant's Interrogatories), Andrus
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
194. 444 U.S. at 66.
195. Id at 67-68.
196. The owners of the artifacts argued that "a collection of antique artifacts is not the
type of property that can generate income by being 'displayed for profit.' " Appellee's Brief,
supra note 193, at 31 n.53.
197. The value of property is in large part a measure of the economic gain that can be
anticipated therefrom. A. JAFFE & C. SIRMANS, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT DECISION MAK-
ING 6 (1982).
198. 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (citations omitted).
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use."' 99 The only reasonable expectation arising from investment, then,
is that the government will not act to deprive the thing invested in of its
economic viability. While this test considerably narrows the range of
protected investment interests, it is not free from ambiguity. Analysis of
its linguistic components and its application is helpful in determining
what the Court means by "economically viable use."
The term "viability" is most often used, both in federal jurispru-
dence and in society generally, in reference to the potential ability of a
fetus to survive outside the mother's womb. In the abortion rights cases,
the Supreme Court has refined the concept of viability somewhat, stat-
ing most recently: "Viability is reached when, in the judgment of the
attending physician on the particular facts in the case before him, there
is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus' sustained survival outside the
womb, with or without artificial support."' 0 0 The term "sustained sur-
vival" is used to exclude circumstances in which only "momentary" sur-
vival is possible. 20 ' Transposing the Court's concept of viability from
the fetal to the property context, an economic viability standard would
protect the investor's expectation that the land and improvements are
capable of survival in the economic world-that is, capable of sustaining
economic (revenue-generating) activity.20 2 Just as a fetus may be viable
although afflicted with a deformity, a disease that shortens its life span
to a limited-though not momentary-time, or a condition that re-
quires technology such as an incubator or respirator for survival,20 3 a use
of land may be economically viable even though it is not the preferred
use, not a highly profitable use, and not a use that will necessarily gener-
ate revenue equal to the original investment. The viability concept re-
fers to a minimal level of sustaining human life, and hence, a minimal
level of economic life.
This somewhat literalist borrowing from the field of abortion law to
interpret language used in quite another context is vindicated by the
consistency of the resulting analysis with the holdings of the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts that apply the economic viability
199. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 296 (1981)
(quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
200. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388 (1979); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160,
163 (1973).
201. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 387.
202. In the bankruptcy context, a debtor's viability has been held to depend upon its "abil-
ity to generate some income available for payment of fixed charges." In re Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 325 F. Supp. 302, 304 (D. Pa. 1971). The term has also been equated with "self-
sustaining." Id.
203. See, e.g., People v. Apodaca, 76 Cal. App. 3d 479, 490, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830, 837 (1978);
Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 78, 220 A.2d 222, 223 (1966).
[VOL. 43:518
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE BALANCE
standard. The courts have focused primarily on the existence of a per-
mitted revenue-generating use, and the suitability of the affected prop-
erty for that use." °4 Thus, in Penn Centra4 the Court relied on the
owners' ability to continue the existing use, which all parties conceded
was earning a reasonable return.20 5 This application of the economic
viability standard is also apparent in Andrus v. Allard20 6 Although the
regulatory scheme prohibited selling the artifacts, it permitted the
owner to exhibit them, a use which had only a mere possibility of gener-
ating revenue.20 7 Yet the existence of this possibility, for which the arti-
facts-as objects of aesthetic and historic interest-appeared suitable,
was sufficient to vindicate the investment interest.
Perhaps even more emphatic is the decision in Hodel v. Vi'rginia Sur-
face Mining &Reclamation Association.2°" Holding that the federal Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act 20 9 did not deny owners the eco-
nomically viable use of their property, the Court stated:
The Surface Mining Act easily survives scrutiny under this
test. First, the Act does not, on its face,210 prevent beneficial
use of coal bearing lands. Except for the proscription of min-
ing near certain locations. . . , the Act does not categorically
prohibit surface coal mining, it merely regulates the conditions
under which such operations may be conducted. The Act does
not purport to regulate alternative uses to which coal bearing
204. See infra note 212. The suitability criterion is seen most commonly in cases and stat-
utes defining situations in which a variance from zoning laws may be granted. E.g., S.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-7-740 (Law. Co-op. 1977). The purpose of the zoning variance is, of course,
to assure the constitutionality of the scheme by providing for exceptions in hardship situations
which could be considered "takings."
205. The challenged ordinance was applicable only so long as the property owner was able
to obtain a reasonable return on investment, and the owner did not challenge the trial court's
finding that this statutory guarantee was being met. 438 U.S. at 129 n.26. The Court found
this protection sufficient, but indicated that it might be even more than was constitutionally
required. Id. at 136. Other terms used in Penn Central to describe the constitutionally pro-
tected property interest were the ability "to profit" from the property interest, id., and the
"economic viability" of the property, id. at 138 n.36. Justice Rehnquist took the majority to
task for its failure to settle on a single test. Id at 149 n. 13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In
subsequent opinions the Court has coalesced behind the economic viability standard. See infra
notes 208-18 and accompanying text.
206. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
207. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
208. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
209. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1983). The district court had held unconstitutional provi-
sions prohibiting mining in certain locations and setting performance standards for surface
mining on steep slopes, including a requirement that the site be returned to its "approximate
original contour." 452 U.S. at 293.
210. Presented with no specific parcel allegedly "taken" by the statute, the Court was
judging only its facial validity. 452 U.S. at 294-96.
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lands may be put.2 1
The Court thus explicitly accepts the concept that the availability of
some beneficial use satisfies the owner's reasonable investment-backed
expectations. In Virgi'na Surface Mining, the Court was not presented
with a specific tract allegedly unsuitable for permitted uses or with an
allegation that certain existing improvements were rendered economi-
cally nonviable by the law.2 12
The same principles are inherent in cases in which state laws that
protect investment values were challenged on first amendment grounds.
Zoning laws placing burdensome restrictions on certain undesirable
types of "expressive" activity have been invalidated.21 3 In these cases
the economic viability of nearby property was not harmed by the ex-
pressive use, and hence the investment interest added little weight to the
legislative side of the balance. In contrast, in Zacchz'iniv. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.,2 14 the broadcast of a human cannonball's entire per-
formance on a news program may have threatened its continued eco-
nomic value: "[I]f the public can see the act free on television, it will be
less willing to pay to see it at the fair. ' '215 If so,2 16 the Court held, a state
211. Id at 296.
212. The lower court opinions are also consistent with a limited viability concept; typical
interpretations only protect property owners against government actions that render their
property "valueless,"Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210, 1213 (Ct. Cl. 1981), or deny its
use and enjoyment, United States v. 2,175.86 Acres of Land, 520 F. Supp. 75, 80 (E.D. Tex.
1981).
The courts have uniformly rejected claims that land has been deprived of economic
viability by regulations permitting a use for which the site was suited, but which would gener-
ate substantially less revenue than some other intended use. E.g., Jentgen v. United States,
657 F.2d 1210, 1213-14 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192-93
(Ct. Cl. 1981); William C. Haas & Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117,
1120-21 (1979). Citing Agins as authority, Giuhano v. Town of Edgartown expressly applied the
economic viability standard to an ordinance limiting subdivisions to ten lots annually. 531 F.
Supp. 1076, 1084-85 (1982) (citing Agins, 447 U.S. at 260). The plaintiff's contention that this
limitation undermined the economic viability of the land by preventing the planned 50-lot
subdivision was rejected by the court as merely a rephrasing of the discredited diminution in
value test. Id. at 1085.
The Gw/iano court used as convincing evidence of the continuing economic viability
of the tract its saleability as restricted. Id. at 1084-85. This focus reinforces the idea that
property loses its economic viability only when it becomes incapable of any use such that no
one would be willing to buy it. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text. The saleability
concept applied by the court evidenced no concern for the price received in the sale, but only
for the fact of saleability.
213. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981) (citing Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1974);
Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1976)). But see Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 n. 18 (1976) (ordinance restricting location of adult theatres not
unconstitutional, as Constitution allows reasonable time, place and manner restrictions).
214. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
215. Id. at 575.
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law permitting the performer to recover damages from the broadcaster
was not unconstitutional. Only when the entire economic value of the
property 2 17 is at stake has the investment interest had a significant im-
pact on a balance involving limitation of first amendment rights.
2 ,8
This interpretation demonstrates a marked adherence by the Court
to traditional concepts, even in the midst of what looks and sounds like a
new analytical framework. In protecting only the investor's ability to
make some economically viable use of the property, the Court is forging
a close link between pre-and post-Penylvania Coal case law.2 19 Only a
regulation that resembles an appropriation in all but form invades the
protected investment interest. The Court never has stated explicitly
that the fundamental investment interest is infringed only by a govern-
ment act that constitutes an appropriation in all but form. However,
the dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas & Electr'c Co. v. City of San
Di ego,220 with which four Justices joined and a fifth expressed substan-
tial agreement, 22 expressly acknowledged this approach. Noting the
"essential similarity of regulatory 'takings' and other 'takings,' ",222 the
dissent stated:
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and
other land-use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment
of property in order to promote the public good just as effec-
tively as formal condemnation or physical invasion of prop-
erty. From the property owner's point of view, it may matter
216. The Court recognized the possibility that "the news broadcast increased the value of
[the act] by stimulating the public's interest in seeing [it] live. In these circumstances, peti-
tioner would not be able to prove damages and thus would not recover." Id. at 575 n. 12.
217. The Zacchini case involved a form of property unknown at the time the constitutional
provisions were adopted - the "right of publicity," that is, a property interest in one's name,
face, or in this case, performance.
218. The Court also noted a number of factors that lessened the weight of the first amend-
ment interest. The challenged state law did not prevent the broadcaster from reporting news-
worthy facts about the performance. 433 U.S. at 574-75. Nor did the performer seek to
enjoin the broadcast of his act; rather, compensation was sought. Id. at 5 73-74. Distinguish-
ing this case from Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), which limited a magazine's liability
for linking an individual to a play that allegedly falsely described an incident in the individ-
ual's life, the Court stated:
[T]he two torts ["right of publicity" and "depicting plaintiff in a false light"] differ
in the degree to which they intrude on dissemination of information to the public.
In "false light" cases the only way to protect the interests involved is to attempt to
minimize publication of the damaging matter, while in "right of publicity" cases the
only question is who gets to do the publishing.
433 U.S. at 573.
219. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
220. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221. See id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 651.
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little whether his land is condemned or flooded, or whether it
is restricted by regulation to use in its natural state, if the effect
in both cases is to deprive him of all beneficial use of it ....
It is only logical, then, that government action other than ac-
quisition of title, occupancy or physical invasion can be a "tak-
ing," and therefore a de facto exercise of the power of eminent
domain, where the effects completely deprive the owner of all
or most of his interest in the property.
2 23
As thus interpreted, Pennsylvania Coal did not open wide the door to
constitutional scrutiny of legislative enactments affecting property;
rather, it simply debarred governments from doing by regulation that
which they were not permitted to do through eminent domain-deprive
an individual of the total economic value of his property.
2. Economic Value and Implied Consent.-The recent case of Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co.,2 2 4 goes further to suggest that even where the eco-
nomic value of property is totally destroyed by government act, that act
affects no fundamental property right if the elements of implied consent
are present. The Court did not use the term "implied consent" '2 25 in its
analysis, but its reasoning is essentially the same as that used to vindi-
cate government infringements of the privacy interest pursuant to an
implied consent theory.226
The property involved in Monsanto was not the usual real estate or
tangible personal property; it was a trade secret. The Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) requires that any pesti-
cide must be registered with the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) prior to marketing.227 The application for registration must in-
clude product formulae, test data relative to the safety and efficacy of
the product, and other information required by EPA.228 Some of this
data, which would be classified as trade secrets under state law, was
recognized by the Court as subject to a property interest. 229 FIFRA has
taken several positions concerning the treatment of trade secrets. Prior
to 1972 it was silent on the matter. From 1972 through 1978 it prohib-
223. Id. at 652-53 (citations omitted).
224. 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
225. See supra notes 137-54 and accompanying text.
226. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973), the description of the
implied consent theory is similar to the analysis in Monsanto- "[B]usinessmen engaged in such
federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their
trade. . . . The businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions
placed upon him."
227. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1980).
228. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. at 2865.
229. Id. at 2873-74.
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ited the use or disclosure of trade secrets outside the context of the appli-
cation unless the applicant consented. Amendments added in 1978,
however, expressly allow public disclosure of certain data and internal
use of an applicant's data in evaluating competitors' applications.2"'
In determining whether disclosure or "internal use"2 ' of trade
secrets submitted to EPA during these various periods worked a taking
of Monsanto's fundamental property interests, the Court did not focus
on the economic viability inquiry. Indeed, it acknowledged that disclo-
sure of a trade secret totally destroyed the economic value of the prop-
erty,2" 2 which lies in the competitive advantage provided by the
unavailability of the information to competitors. 23  Nevertheless, the
Court upheld the statute that provided for the disclosure.23 4 Character-
izing registration as a government benefit for which Monsanto volunta-
rily applied,23 5 the Court reasoned that under the 1978 statute
Monsanto had knowingly exchanged its right to prevent disclosure of its
trade secrets for the ability to market pesticides in this country.23 6
This is the same implied consent theory the Court has used to up-
hold administrative searches of specifically licensed or highly regulated
business properties. 237 The theory has been limited in that context to
government acts authorized by statutes that are industry-specific and
give adequate notice of the potential government intervention such that
the voluntary operation of the affected enterprise could fairly be charac-
terized as implied consent to the intervention. 23 8 FIFRA, as amended in
1978, meets all these criteria, and the Court's analysis of that statute and
230. Id. at 2869-70.
231. The term "internal use" will be used to refer to EPA's use of data submitted by one
applicant for registration in evaluating the application of a competitor.
232. AMontsanio, 104 S. Ct. at 2878.
233. Id at 2878 n.15.
234. Only the disclosure of data submitted between 1972 and 1978, when the secrecy of the
data was statutorily guaranteed, was held to be a taking. Id. at 2878.
235. The Court reasoned that the registration was voluntary not solely because the appli-
cant engaged in a business enterprise, but also because the manufacturer had the alternative
of foregoing registration and marketing its product only in foreign countries. Id. at 2875-76 &
n. ll.
236. Id. at 2876.
237. See supra notes 137-54 and accompanying text. In Monsanto, the Court mentions that
the case involves the right to exclude, implying that there is a privacy interest. 104 S. Ct. at
2878-79 (discussing the period from 1972-1978). Privacy, with respect to a trade secret, how-
ever, has no significance other than as a means to economic advantage.
238. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text. This implied consent theory could also
justify, e.g., statutes such as those requiring subdivision developers to contribute land or funds
for facilities to serve the occupants of the subdivision. See N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND
PLANNING LAW § 156.08 (1978). Application for the permit to subdivide would be the act
evidencing consent. Indeed, the implied consent theory has potentially broad application to
land development, which normally requires one or more permits. See supra note 188.
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the statutes authorizing warrantless inspections of the above facilities is
substantially identical.
The Court, however, also upheld EPA's disclosure and internal use
of data submitted to it prior to 1972 when the Act contained no express
provisions concerning disclosure.23 9 Indeed, the only arguably relevant
statutory provision before 1972 was the Trade Secrets Act2 4 ° which im-
posed criminal penalties on federal employees who revealed trade secrets
without authorization.2 4 ' Yet the Court held that Monsanto had no
reasonable expectation that its trade secrets would remain inviolate in
the hands of EPA. 24 2 The holding concerning the pre-1972 data differs
from the holding on the post-1978 data in the important respect that the
Act then contained no express notice to the applicant that registration,
and the consequent ability to market its product in this country, in-
volved relinquishment of the right to prevent disclosure of its trade
secrets. Notice and voluntary relinquishment have been the foundation
of the Court's implied consent theory as applied to industrial and com-
mercial property owners. The Court explained its decision to uphold
the disclosure and internal use of pre-1972 data rather summarily:
In an industry that long has been the focus of great public
concern and significant government regulation, the possibility
was substantial that the Federal Government, which had thus
far taken no position on disclosure of health, safety, and envi-
ronmental data concerning pesticides, upon focusing on the is-
sue, would find disclosure to be in the public interest.24 3
This statement indicates that the notice, from which arises the limita-
tion on reasonable expectations, derives not from express statutory pro-
visions, but from the understanding that the enactment of such
statutory provisions is not unlikely in an industry "that long has been
the focus of great public concern."
Elsewhere the Court referred to the express disclosure and internal
use provisions as among "the burdens we all must bear in exchange for
'the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized commu-
nity.' ,,2" Apparently significant to the Court was the fact that Mon-
239. 104 S. Ct. at 2876-77.
240. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970 & Supp. 1984).
241. See id. Justice O'Connor argued that the Trade Secrets Act formed the basis for a
reasonable expectation of nondisclosure. 104 S. Ct. at 2883-84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in
part).
242. Id. at 2877.
243. Id. at 2876.
244. Id. at 2875 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979); Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). The strength of the public
concern and extent of prior regulation were given more weight in the analysis of the pre-1972
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santo voluntarily registered its trade secret with the EPA to secure the
economic advantages of registration, and thus lost its right to secrecy.
24 5
This reasoning draws from the "clothed with a public interest" analysis
used in the 1930's to reject broad property autonomy; 246 when property
is used in a way that affects the public, its owner has no reasonable
expectation of freedom from government regulation. By voluntarily
commencing or continuing such an enterprise, he voluntarily relin-
quishes a certain amount of autonomy. Under Monsanto, he may also be
relinquishing the total economic value of certain property involved in
the enterprise.
It may have been important to the court that registration, which
resulted in the total loss of the economic value of the trade secret to
Monsanto, also brought about economic gain, by enabling Monsanto to
market its pesticide in the United States. Thus, Monsanto's overall eco-
nomic position was not disadvantaged by the registration and conse-
quent disclosure, even though the total economic value of some of its
assets was destroyed. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
the Court stated, "[T]aking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a par-
ticular segment have been entirely abrogated." '4 7 The Court refused to
consider whether total destruction of the value of the airspace alone
would be a taking, focusing rather on the parcel as a whole. It is possi-
ble that this policy against dividing a single economic unit into each
conceivable segment influenced the Court in Monsanto. Where Mon-
santo voluntarily undertook an action that was beneficial to the enter-
prise as a whole, the court would not hear its complaint that its
economic position had been unfairly disadvantaged thereby.
Although the reach of Monsanto is potentially broad, its facts suggest
limitations on the theory of implied consent to the destruction of the
economic interest in property. First, the Monsanto case arose in the con-
text of business activity, long regarded as constitutionally susceptible to
wide-ranging regulation.2 4 Indeed, the expectation of regulation which
gives rise to constructive notice under the pre-1972 statute is founded
statute than in the analysis of the amended statute, as they were the only source of notice to
the applicant. See id. at 2876. Without notice, there would be no conscious relinquishment of
property rights in exchange for overall economic gain.
245. Id. at 2876-77.
246. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. The Court's analysis also recalls the
traditional legal principle: "Every citizen in making his arrangements in reliance on the con-
tinued existence of the laws as they are, takes on himself the risk of their being changed
*. " 6 RCL § 296 (1929).
247. 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
248. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
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upon Monsanto's business activity in a field of substantial public con-
cern and prior regulatory activity. Further, to the extent that the quid
pro quo aspect of the case is important-the exchange of certain eco-
nomically valuable property for overall economic gain-this characteri-
zation of the facts is much more feasible in the business context. Thus,
the Monsanto analysis is limited at least to the circumstances in which the
government would be empowered to restrict property autonomy, and
may require an even stronger showing of public interest, particularly
where constructive notice is relied upon.
The second potentially limiting aspect of Monsanto is the nature of
the property interest in the case-a trade secret. A trade secret is one of
many types of intangible interest that recently has been recognized as a
property interest. As such, its foothold in traditional beliefs and expec-
tations is less secure, and therefore, the Court may accord it a lesser
degree of protection than would be given to traditional objects of prop-
erty such as land and chattels.2 49 A trade secret, moreover, is the prod-
uct of the regulated business activity; before Monsanto went into the
pesticide business, there was no formula and hence no property interest
in the secrecy of the formula. The property is an integral and insepara-
ble part of the business activity, and has never been the subject of invest-
ment except within the context of that activity. Its only value is a
competitive advantage in the affected business context. Thus, the prop-
erty itself is clothed with the public interest affecting the business in a
way that is not true of interests in land or structures or bulldozers. It is
much easier to label unreasonable an industrialist's expectation that the
value to be derived from a trade secret will not be destroyed by govern-
ment act, than similarly to label his expectation that the government
will not destroy the value of land or structures.
The fact that Monsanto involved a trade secret may have influenced
the Court's holding. It is unlikely, however, that the holding will be
restricted to intangible property such as trade secrets. A broader inter-
pretation of the implied consent doctrine is consistent with the Court's
expansive view of legislative authority in the economic realm, which is
apparent in its treatment of the autonomy and privacy cases. The nota-
ble similarity of the Monsanto analysis to the principles apparent in the
autonomy and privacy areas suggests that the Court's analysis has coa-
lesced into a unified approach to legislative restrictions on productive
uses of property. Keyed to principles of the voluntariness of business
activity, the pervasive effects of such activity on the public, and the
power of the state to control such effects, the Court's approach sharply
249. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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limits the extent to which expectations of government nonintervention
will be recognized as reasonable. The Court is likely to be more protec-
tive of investment values than those of autonomy or privacy in the busi-
ness context, 5 0 but may be inclined to examine the impact of a
regulatory scheme on the economic interests of a property holder in the
aggregate, 251 bearing in mind the property holder's voluntary assump-
tion of both the benefits and burdens of his chosen enterprise.
Analysis of the investment interest thus focuses primarily on the
economic viability of the property rights retained by the owner follow-
ing regulation. The owner's fundamental investment interest guaran-
tees no more than the existence of some revenue-generating use such
that the total economic value of the property has not been destroyed.
Under Monsanto, however, even a total destruction of economic value
need not affect the fundamental investment interest if the owner im-
pliedly consents, by its voluntary application for a government privilege
conditioned on the destruction of value or likely to be so conditioned in
the future.
V. PHYSICAL CONTROL - THE LoRErTo DECISION
The Court's recent decision in Loretto v. Manhattan Te/epromoter
CA TV Corp.252 provides an interesting twist to the interpretive principles
that determine the scope of the investment interest. The Court has lim-
ited constitutional protection of the investment interest to the economic
viability of the property, requiring only that the owner be able to use
and enjoy the property in some fashion. In that context, a very limited
protection of the owner's economic interest in the property is provided.
Essentially, only appropriations-depriving the owner of physical con-
trol-and regulations having an equivalent impact are recognized as af-
fecting constitutional property. In Loretto, the Court was guided by the
same legal tradition barring government appropriations, but applied
the concept in a formal sense, separated from the underlying concern for
the economic impact on the property owner. Under Loretto, any depri-
vation of physical control or use and enjoyment of any part of the prop-
erty is not only a deprivation of constitutional property, but one that
250. Capacity for revenue generation is the owner's primary expectation in regard to pro-
ductive resources. Privacy in this context seems almost a derivative value, being necessary to
maximize the revenue-generating potential of the property.
251. Cf Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1977)(" 'Taking'
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.").
252. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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cannot be outweighed by even a compelling state interest.253
The statute ruled unconstitutional in Loretto provided that a land-
lord may not "interfere with the installation of cable television facilities
upon his property or premises," demand payment from any tenant for
permitting such installation, or demand payment from the cable com-
pany in excess of an amount determined reasonable by the State Com-
mission on Cable Television.154 A reasonable amount had been set by
the State Commission at one dollar.2 55 Despite the fact that the cable
installation occupied approximately one-eighth of a cubic foot of space
on the roof of the complainant's apartment building,2 56 was not noticed
by the complainant for the first two years she owned the building,
25 7
and was not shown to interfere with her use and enjoyment of the build-
ing or its value, the Court held that there was a taking solely because the
property holder had been deprived of her possession and control.2 58 In
so holding the Court carved out a realm of government actions that
constitute per se takings: those which provide for a permanent physical
occupation of the property without the owner's consent.2 59 In so fram-
ing its per se test, the Court expressed its concern for the owner's loss of
253. Id. at 427. See also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575
(1977) (exclusive control as fundamental to performer's property interest in his act). Seegener-
ally Michelman, supra note 17, at 1184-1185 (discussing absolute rule of compensation for
physical encroachment).
254. 458 U.S. at 423. Had this statute been judged on the principles applicable to non-
ouster government actions, it would seem that the owner's use of the premises to provide
shelter for members of the public would amount to "affecting the premises with a public
interest" thus authorizing government actions protective of the tenants, particularly actions
that assured that they were provided with facilities and services regarded as "necessities." See
supra notes 60-77 and accompanying text. Further, the cable company, acting at the request
of the tenant, could be viewed as an invitee. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
Although the government's power to enact legislation protective of tenants would be limited
by the landlord's interest in protecting his investment, this interest was not affected under the
facts of Loretto.
255. Id. at 423-24. A dissenting judge on the court of appeals had held that although the
statute effected a taking, the one dollar award was just compensation. Id. at 424.
256. Id. at 443.
257. Id. n.2.
258. Id at 441. The Court also noted that prior to enactment of the statute, Teleprompter
routinely paid substantial compensation to property owners for the rights now accorded it by
statute. d at 423.
259. Id. at 426. The Court used the word "occupation" to distinguish the relevant actions
from those providing for a physical "invasion" such as the public right of use in Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. The
Court made it clear that the Loretto per se rule was not intended to apply to physical invasions
such as the one involved in Kaiser Aetna. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12. The word "permanent"
is perhaps a misnomer, as the Court recognized that the servitude imposed on the land by the
statute was not permanent in any strict sense of the term. Id. at 439 & n. 17. Rather, the
Court used the term to connote an occupation that is continuous rather than intermittent and
that will continue for a significant-perhaps indefinite-period of time. See id. at 428-35.
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possession26 of a part of the property, carrying with it a loss of use,
enjoyment, and control.26 1
The Loretto court relied on a body of pre-Pennsylvania Coal law 62
holding that government action affecting property violated the takings
clause only if it effected "a practical ouster of (the owner's) posses-
sion. '2 63 The classic case for a taking under this rule was Pumpel4y v.
Green Bay Co.,264 in which the damming of a creek, pursuant to state law,
resulted in the inundation of the complainant's land. The difference
between the early cases and Loretto lies in the scope of the ouster. In
Pumpelly and similar cases, the ouster involved all or a large part of a
tract of land held by the complainant. 265 In Loretto, the ouster involved
a few cubic inches on the exterior of an urban apartment building, hav-
ing no adverse effect on the use of the building. The Court may have
perceived a difficulty in future line-drawing if it made the determina-
tion of unconstitutionality dependent on the physical scope of the
ouster. However, the line-drawing problem, which has existed in the
area of non-ouster takings since Pennsylvania Coal, is one frequently en-
260. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36. The transfer of a right of possession in Loretto can be
contrasted with the transfer of a mere right of use in Kaiser Aetna. The comparison is some-
what strained in a case such as Loretto, however, where the physical occupation is of the type
provided for in the law of property by an easement or license, connoting a right of use, rather
than by a possessory estate. See 3 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 405 (1979) (defining and
classifying easements).
261. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37. The Court refers to CATV as having "complete domin-
ion" over the affected portions of the building. Id. at 436.
262. Id at 427-28.
263. Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878), quotedin Loretto, 458 U.S. at
428. At the time, such language was intended to denote a government action which effected a
physical appropriation under the guise of a regulation. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
669 (1887). The result turned on whether the effect on the landowner appeared to be an
appropriation or merely consequential damage. See, e.g., Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S.
217, 225 (1904).
264. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871). It is very unlikely that the Court of this era would
have applied the "practical ouster" rule to a situation such as that presented in Loretto-the
ouster from eight cubic inches of space on the exterior of a multistory building. In a case after
Pumpelly it was said that Pumpe/ly represented the "extremest qualification" placed on the
state's police power by the Constitution. Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. at 642.
265. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 167-69. The early cases cited by the Court in support of its posi-
tion did not involve this question. See Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (whether fort's firing of guns across complainant's land over a
period of years constituted a taking); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 195
U.S. 540 (1904) (whether statute authorizing placement of telegraph lines on post roads of the
United States had been intended to include placement on railroads); St. Louis v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893) (whether federal statute authorizing telegraph company
to use public lands prohibited city from charging for use of city streets). Statements in these
cases did, however, indicate the Court's view that the compensation for such partial taking
should normally be accomplished through eminent domain. E.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 195 U.S. at 566-74.
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countered by the Court in weighing the relative merits of legislative en-
actments and claims of individual right. Indeed, as noted by the dissent,
the analytical framework for drawing such lines in the non-ouster con-
text could be readily adapted to deal with ousters as well.2 66 Whether
there was a taking in either context would depend on the impact upon
the property owner's reasonable expectations with respect to privacy,
autonomy, and economic use.
Nor did the Court advert to the principle so firmly established in
Penn Central that "[t]aking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a par-
ticular segment have been entirely abrogated." '6 7 Had it done so, it
would have been forced to conclude that the statute's impact on the
property as a whole was negligible. It is clear that the Court was judg-
ing the statute in Loretto by a different set of rules from those applied to
other types of restrictions on property, and the Court acknowledged as
much. The Court adverted to the "special kind of injury when a stran-
ger directly invades and occupies the owner's property,''" 6 citing as au-
thority Professor Michelman's influential article on the takings clause. 69
Acknowledging the strong public reaction that was likely to follow a
governmental invasion of property, Michelman stated:
Physical possession doubtless is the most cherished prerogative,
and the most dramatic index, of ownership of tangible things.
Sophisticated rationalizations and assurances of overall even-
ness which may stand up as long as one's possessions are un-
molested may wilt before the stark spectacle of an alien,
uninvited presence in one's territory. The psychological shock,
the emotional protest, the symbolic threat to all property and
security, may be expected to reach their highest pitch when
government is an unabashed invader.2 7 °
Michelman was expounding a theory in which compensibility is largely
determined by the insecurity regarding property, and indeed social or-
der itself, that is generated by a government act.2 7 ' Surely that theory is
stretched to the limit if applied to the attachment of a cable to the exte-
266. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 442-56. Further, Michelman notes that the administrative con-
venience of clear line-drawing is outweighed in this instance by the inappropriateness of the
line that is drawn and its failure to resolve many takings questions. Michelman, supra note 17,
at 1227-28.
267. 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
268. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436 (emphasis omitted).
269. See Michelman, supra note 17, at 1228 & n. 110.
270. Id. at 1228 (footnote omitted). It should be noted that Michelman drew no distinc-
tions here between physical invasions and occupations. But see id. at 1229 n. 110.
271. Id. at 1225-26.
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rior of an apartment building in order to provide communication serv-
ices to the tenants residing within, an act hardly likely to generate
"moral outrage" of the sort posited by Michelman.2 7 2 Michelman him-
self criticized "physical invasion" tests on the very ground that they pro-
vide compensation for purely nominal harms based on the fortuitous
circumstances of the invasion.2 73 His discussion ultimately rejected the
physical invasion test as unacceptably arbitrary.
27 4
Such arbitrariness is apparent in the Loretto opinion, which rein-
troduces with a vengeance the formalistic distinctions of nineteenth cen-
tury case law. Whereas Pennsylvania Coal had shifted the focus to the
magnitude of the effect on property-related values, Loretto adopts the
position that the Pennsylvania Coal magnitude principle supplemented
rather than replaced the formalistic analysis of prior decisions. The arti-
ficiality of the resulting distinctions is demonstrated by the Court's ex-
press suggestion that a statute requiring the landlord to provide cable
service to tenants upon request might be treated differently from the
challenged statute, which authorized cable companies to provide such
service to tenants. 275 The impact on the landlord's essential property
interests is the same in both instances, despite the Court's protestations
about the landlord's greater ability to "minimize the physical, aesthetic,
and other effects of the installation. '2
76
Loretto, then, departs from the trend of recent Supreme Court case
law involving constitutional property. Although most government ac-
tions that affect property are virtually unchallengeable unless they have
certain defined effects on the owner's interests in autonomy, privacy or
protection of investment, actions resulting in a "practical ouster" from
even the smallest part of the property are totally beyond government
authority absent compensation.27 7 Other than the traditional eminent
272. Id. at 1229 n. 110. Michelman also suggests that "only those trespassory acts which
are implicitly assertive of ownership" require compensation. Id.
273. Id. at 1227-28.
274. Id. at 1229.
275. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440 n. 19; see also id. at 435-36; see generally Michelman, supra note
17, at 1185-86. (discussing artificiality of a similar distinction).
276. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440 n.19. Also disturbing is the majority's failure to recognize the
extent to which the premises were affected with the public interest, being used as they were to
provide housing for renters. This, plus the property interests of those renters (holders of es-
tates for years in their respective dwellings) would suggest the appropriateness at least of a
balancing test, and perhaps a low-priority balancing involving the mere rationality standard.
See supra note 254. The majority were berated by the dissenters for failing to consider these
interests. Id at 445 n.3, 449, 454 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
277. The Court felt that the size of the ouster should be dealt with in the second stage of
the case, as indicative of "just compensation." Id. at 437-38.
It is uncertain whether an implied consent rule can justify invasions of the interest in
physical control. The business of rental housing, in which Loretto was engaged, is increas-
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doman situations, in which the government appropriates an estate in
land or an affirmative easement, government acts falling under the
Loretto rule will be rare. The Court itself acknowledged that escape from
the "per se takings" rule is as simple as rephrasing the statute to read as
a restriction on the property owner rather than the creation of a power
in some third party to effect a "permanent physical occupation." Thus,
the limit on government power to diminish property rights will continue
to be judged primarily by the effect on autonomy, privacy, and
investment.
CONCLUSION
The Burger Court's widespread discussions and holdings concern-
ing property are overdue. Alterations in the forms, distribution, and
effects of property in American society have long demanded reconsider-
ation of the role of private property vis A vis government. Initially, the
Constitution was viewed as protecting the public as property holder
from government intervention. Even the lynchpin of modern takings
law, Pennsylvan'a Coal Co. v. Mahon, represents this perspective, as it ex-
panded the types of government action that may be invalidated. The
post-depression expansion of regulation into a wide range of property-
related activities represents the view that the public in many instances
requires government intervention to protect it from the excesses of prop-
erty holders. Under this view, the Constitution must be interpreted with
deference to the state in carrying out its protective role. Neither view is
either a totally modern creation or an antiquated historical notion.
Rather, property has at all times been both a foundation of, and an
obstacle to, liberty. The evolution of our social and economic structure
and our perceptions of social justice requires a continuing reevaluation
of the delicate balance between the opposing roles of property and the
constitutional response. It is thus a welcome development that the Bur-
ger Court has commenced a dialogue in this area after many years of
virtual silence.
The dialogue exhibits the difficulties inherent in the task. A read-
ing of one or several individual cases may leave an impression of hope-
ingly regulated in order to protect the interests of the tenants. Thus it could have been held
that the landlord impliedly consents to such restrictions, including those aimed at providing
tenants with access to modern communications media. The Court's failure to do so may
indicate that the implied consent theory will not apply to the interest in physical control. On
the other hand, it may simply indicate that the court views landlords differently from busi-
nessmen, that the tradition of regulation is not well enough established in regard to landlords
to justify the implication of consent, or that landlords do not operate in a climate of "perva-
sive" regulation.
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less confusion and controversy. Significant disagreements among the
Justices are apparent.218 Yet from the case law as a whole emerges a
pattern of ideas that begins to provide a consistent, yet flexible, basis for
reconciling the interests of the public as property owner and the public
as property regulator.
The state is allowed to provide for the public welfare as it sees fit so
long as certain primary values inherent in the institution of property are
not disturbed beyond the range of what might reasonably have been
expected. One consistent theme that emerges is the priority given to
property-related activities which do not significantly affect the public.
This principle reflects the post-Lochner, New Deal acceptance of a perva-
sive state role to protect the public from the adverse effects of property,
as well as the recognition in the modern "right of privacy" cases that
there are areas of activity which are simply none of the public's busi-
ness.279 These ideas are determinative in cases involving property-re-
lated autonomy, and are highly influential in privacy and investment
cases as well. In the latter areas, however, the fact that the property is
"clothed with a public interest" does not vitiate the interest of the prop-
erty owner, though it may enable the state to impose otherwise imper-
missible restrictions through the fiction of "implied consent." Despite
public need, the property owner retains a high priority interest in physi-
cal control, and, where consent cannot be implied, priority interests in
privacy and in preserving the economic viability of that in which he has
invested. Government actions affecting any of these interests will be
subjected to intensive scrutiny and must serve a public interest of great
consequence in order to prevail, if indeed they may prevail at all.28 °
278. One of the primary disputes concerns the extent to which the "arcane" distinctions of
real property law, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 149 n.17 (1978)), should be determinative. This dispute is apparent in Loretto, in
which the dissent labeled the majority opinion "curiously anachronistic." 458 U.S. at 442
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). It also surfaces in Justice Rehnquist's view, apparently not shared
by the majority, that a government regulation which could be characterized as the creation of
an easement, should be held to be a taking. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
180 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142-43
(1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
279. This perception is reflected in the following observation from RICHARD REEvEs'
AMERICAN JOURNEY: TRAVELING WITH TOCQUEVILLE IN SEARCH OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 55 (1982):
There is no law or system that can't be beaten by resourceful, energetic people.
Which laws were obeyed, and which disobeyed, told me something about the Amer-
ican character: Americans, individually, routinely, and guiltlessly violated almost all
laws attempting to regulate private, personal behavior or entrepreneurial commerce
and labor performed during what has traditionally been defined as personal time.
Within bounds defined by history and the energy and effectiveness of government
enforcement, Americans did not consider those things lawbreaking or cheating.
280. The Court held in Loretto that no government interest is sufficiently compelling to
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Much development of these basic ideas remains for future cases; how-
ever, the existing case law as synthesized in the foregoing presentation at
least provides a framework within which further analysis and interpreta-
tion can proceed to give clearer definition to the troublesome concept of
constitutional property.
outweigh the property owner's interest in physical control, even where only a small portion of
the tract is involved. However, the government is provided with express constitutional mech-
anisms for validating its actions affecting certain priority property interests: a warrant for
intrusions on privacy interests and compensation for intrusions on interests in investment and
physical control.
